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Executive Summary
Subject
This evaluation assesses the European
Commission’s (EC) cooperation with
Honduras over the period 2002-2009.
It aims at providing an overall
independent assessment of the entire
EC cooperation strategy and support in
the country and to draw out key lessons
to help improve current and future EC
strategies and programmes.
Methodology
The evaluation applied a three-phase
gradual approach consisting of desk, field
and synthesis work. It first elaborated an
inventory of EC aid to Honduras in order
to have a comprehensive view on the
cooperation for identifying key areas of
investigation. The cooperation objectives
were reconstructed in the form of an
Intervention Logic based mainly on the
analysis of the EC’s country strategy
papers. This laid the ground for
developing the set of Evaluation
Questions and their corresponding
Judgement Criteria and Indicators. The
sample of interventions for detailed study
was further selected on those bases; it
represented 88% of the funds committed.
Preliminary findings, hypotheses to test
and gaps to fill were formulated based on
desk study before undertaking the field
phase. The evaluation used overall a
combination of different information
sources and tools, including
195 documents and interviews with
97 interviewees in EC Headquarters and
Delegations and among the national
authorities, implementing partners, final
beneficiaries, civil society, and other
donors. Finally, it applied recent
methodological developments in terms of
evaluation of Budget Support operations
(“step one”). This implies three levels of
analysis: (i) the relevance of the inputs
provided, (ii) the direct outputs of these
inputs, and (iii) the quality and adequacy
of the changes supported in the
government systems (induced outputs).
Step One does not include the
appreciation of outcomes and impacts.
Context
National context:
The main characteristics of the national
context are the following:
 a country of 7.8 million inhabitants (in
2008),  with an additional 1-2 million
living abroad;
 a low middle-income country (Gross
national income: $ 1,740 per capita),
with a reasonable gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate over most
of the period: on average 2.9% in
constant terms;
 a country much exposed and
vulnerable to hurricanes (Mitch in
1998);
 High dependency on remittances
(remesas) and offshore factories
(maquilas);
 a very open economy with great
dependency on the USA, affected by
the 2008 worldwide economic crisis;
 change in almost entire administrative
staff after each election;
 acute political and institutional crisis in
June 2009 with most international
cooperation (including EC’s) being
suspended for eight months, elections
in November 2009, new government
since January 2010;
 new International Monetary Fund
(IMF) stand-by agreement in October
2010 after two-year interruption;
 two-thirds of the population under the
poverty line; highest inequality in the
region (Gini index 55.3); and
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 one of the highest levels of crime and
violence in the world (72 murders per
100,000 inhabitants in 2010), relating
to drug trafficking and youth gangs
(maras).
International cooperation:
Total international cooperation (official
development aid - ODA) has represented
a small but significant part of the
resources of this low-to-middle-income
country in recent years, accounting for
4% of its GDP in 2008. The main
contributors were the international banks,
USA, Spain, Japan and the EC. The EC
and the European Union (EU) Member
States accounted together for 33% of the
$4.5bn ODA net disbursements over the
period 2002-2008.
EC cooperation with Honduras:
The EC committed a total of €371m over
the period 2002-2009 for country-specific
interventions in Honduras. 92% of this
support was concentrated in six major
sectors, each of which benefitted from
one or two large programmes. These
sectors are rehabilitation 33% (the
reconstruction programmes following the
1998 hurricane Mitch); environment
17%; poverty reduction 17% (through
General Budget Support);
decentralisation 9% (through Sector
Budget Support); education 8%; and food
security 8% (partially through Sector
Budget Support). The EC is moving into
the justice and security sector, a
development which, although too recent
to show impacts, is included in this
evaluation in terms of relevance of the
approach. Further, there were a number
of smaller projects funded mainly from
EC thematic budget lines such as in the
field of human rights.
Conclusions and
Lessons Learnt
Most of the sectors in which the EC
concentrated its cooperation were
aligned with government priorities
and addressed the needs of the
population well. This was especially the
case with food security, natural resource
management and vocational training. (C1)
The choice of sectors also proved flexible
in adapting to urgent needs relating to
natural disasters (Mitch hurricane), and to
emerging challenges such as the newly-
supported justice and security sector.
Furthermore, by choosing three
interlinked sectors (environment,
decentralisation and food security), the
EC created a strong potential for
synergies at local level which remains to
be fully realised. (C1)
Overall, in food security and in
education, satisfactory results were
achieved. In the field of food security
the budget support and the technical
assistance helped improve the policy
design, policy instruments, legal
framework, budget allocation, and
coordination within the government and
with Non-State Actors. In the field of
education, efforts concentrated on
vocational training: new curricula were
developed and adopted, a significant
number of teachers and staff were
trained, and students from the most
vulnerable groups benefited from
professional insertion programmes and
scholarships (although these two last
modalities proved unsustainable). With
respect to the management of natural
resources, some observations on
promising results can already be made,
notably on local actors’ capacities for
managing natural resources, but there was
no strong policy dialogue on
environmental issues. No clear results
could actually be reported so far since the
main programmes are still ongoing. In
decentralisation local organisations were
strengthened through support in the
sectors of food security and natural
resource management, but no results
have been obtained so far through the
dedicated budget support, because of the
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discontinuation of the decentralisation
policy and the difficult macro-economic
context. (C6)
The EC offered comparative
advantage over EU Member States or
other donors in the post-Mitch
reconstruction, food security and
vocational training. Nevertheless, the
EC is withdrawing from support to food
security in Honduras, and with regard to
education, the EC is now providing a
global budget support covering this
sector but without specific indicators
encouraging consolidation of
achievements in vocational training. (C2)
In public security, the EC approach
was based on an overall well-designed
programme promoting institutional
reform, except that civil society was
not involved from the start as an actor
to promote reform and to monitor
implementation, as recommended by
OECD-DAC guidelines. (C7)
With regard to the interventions’ aid
modalities, these have globally proven
so far to be appropriate in the context
of the country for all project
approaches. This was also the case for
one sector budget support, in food
security (PASAH), as its benefits were
closely related to those of this modality,
notably in terms of strong policy dialogue
and collaboration with the Government
on design and implementation of a State
policy in this sector. But the adequacy
of budget support remains debatable
in one other case (PROADES) as this
programme produced few results so far
in decentralisation, owing mainly to a
shift in political commitment to the
decentralisation policy. Besides, for the
recently launched global budget support
(APERP/APN) it is too early to have a
clear view on the adequacy of this aid
modality. (C4)
In the context of replacement of the
administrative staff after each election,
the EC satisfactorily tried to mitigate
difficulties of administrative
weaknesses by involving the civil society
in the programmes, by providing strong
international technical assistance in
budget support programmes and by
addressing directly the issue of improving
the State’s administrative capacity
through technical assistance coordinated
with other donors. (C5)
Additionally, the following lessons
can be learned from the EC
cooperation in Honduras: serious
sector analysis is key to success; an
incomplete phasing out strategy and lack
of true policy dialogue may hamper
results and sustainability; and significant
results can be obtained with limited
means (cf. the Budget Support in food
security).
Recommendations
All the following recommendations are addressed
to the EC, but differ in importance and urgency.
In chapter 6 they are qualified according to these
criteria.
An in-depth analysis should be conducted
for every focal sector to determine the
best aid modality for delivery of EC aid.
This is especially important for the public
security sector which is highly sensitive
owing to its link with respect for basic
human rights. (R1 and R3).
Civil society should be involved even
more, while respecting the leadership of
the government. (R2)
It could be valuable to encourage
continuity over time and consolidation of
achievements in cooperation fields with
EC added-value, notably by considering
carefully the possibility of further support
in food security and by having indicators
in the general budget support programme
relating to consolidation of key
achievements in vocational training. (R4)
An agenda for a policy dialogue on
environmental issues must be established.
(R5)
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An appraisal (or capitalisation of
experiences) should be conducted on
municipal management, thus establishing
a link between its interventions in
decentralisation, food security and natural
resource management. This would be
useful for the new programmes being
implemented in decentralisation and
environment. (R6)
In order to address administrative
weaknesses, the direct strengthening of
public financial management and of the
administration of some key sectors such
as education and health should be
pursued actively as it was during the
period of analysis, in coordination with
other donors active in this field. (R8)
The incentives built into the BS
conditionality system should be
maintained, by delivering consistent
messages to the Government on the
importance of reaching agreed targets.
(R9)
The Delegation must also have access to
strong public financial management
expertise for ensuring the success of its
Budget Support programme. (R10)
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Maps
The maps below show the position and relative size of Honduras in the world and in the
region. A map of the country is provided on the next page.
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1. Introduction
The Evaluation of the European Commission’s co-operation with Honduras has been commissioned
by the Joint Evaluation Unit for European Union (EU) External Relations1, hereafter
referred to as the Joint Evaluation Unit or JEU. The evaluation has been closely followed
and its different deliverables validated by a Reference Group (RG) consisting of members
of the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) EuropeAid Development and Cooperation
(DEVCO), of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and of the permanent
mission of Honduras to the European Union (as observer), and chaired by the Joint
Evaluation Unit.
This document is the Final Report for this evaluation. It takes account of comments
received from European Commission (EC) Reference Group members and from a wide
range of participants to the Seminar held in Honduras on 28 June 2011.
1.1 Mandate and scope of the evaluation
The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for this evaluation specify two main objectives:
 to provide the relevant external Co-operation Services of the EC and the wider public
with an overall independent assessment of the EC’s past and current cooperation
relations with Honduras; and
 to identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies and
programmes of the EC.
The evaluation covers the EC’s co-operation strategies with Honduras and their
implementation during the period 2002-2009, hence covering eight years of cooperation2.
The evaluation assesses the implementation of the EC’s cooperation, focusing on
effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and efficiency. Furthermore, the evaluation also
assesses the EC value added and issues of coherence, coordination, and complementarities.
1 Until December 2010 it was known as the Joint Evaluation Unit of the Directorates-General (DGs) for External
Relations (RELEX) and Development (DEV) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO).
2 It was decided with the Reference Group at the beginning of this study to extend the 2004-2009 evaluation period
envisaged in the ToR to 2002-2009, given that the period covered by the previous country-level evaluation for
Honduras ended in 2002 and for better correspondence with the period of the 2002-2006 CSP. It was also agreed to
take into consideration events having occurred in 2010 if they were indispensable for the understanding of the EC
cooperation.
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2. Context
This chapter presents a brief overview of (i) the national political, economic and social
background; (ii) the EC cooperation framework with Honduras; (iii) the EC’s intervention
logic; and (iv) the inventory of EC funding in the country over the period 2002-2009.
Details on all these elements are provided in Annexes 2 to 6.
2.1 National background
As shown by the maps presented at the beginning of this report, Honduras is located in
Central America and is bordered by Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Pacific Ocean
with the Gulf of Fonseca to the south, and the Caribbean Sea to the north, by a large inlet,
the Gulf of Honduras. It is just over 112,000 km² in size with an estimated population of
around eight million, which gives a density of only 70 inhabitants/km2. Its capital is
Tegucigalpa.
Key elements of the national background are summarised in the figure below, and
described thereafter.
Figure 1: Country context
Sources and details: See Annex 2
Polit. crisis in June 2009
Elections in Nov 2009
New gov. in Jan 2010
7.8 m inhabitants
+ 1-2m abroad
GDP growth: 2.9% (2002-09),
Remesas: 24% of GDP (2007)
Maquilas: 54% of exports
IMF stand-by
agreement in Oct 2010
65% of population in poverty,
High inequality: GINI 55.3
72 murders per 100,000
inhabitants (2010)
EC Delegation
since 2005
ODA 4.0% of GDP
(2008)
Very open economy
Very dependent on USA
Change of entire admin.
staff after every election
Low middle-income country
(GNI: $1740 per capita)
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2.1.1 Political background
Seven free elections have taken place in Honduras between 1981 and 2005. Two parties,
the National Party (Partido Nacional de Honduras: PNH) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal
de Honduras: PLH) have dominated the political scene with five Liberal presidents and two
Nationalist presidents. Technical and administrative staff were usually replaced after each
election by staff loyal to the newly elected political leader. This typically results in a lack of
continuity in public policies and short-term decision-making for a country, undermining
national development in the longer run. The high staff turnover at all levels also
compromises positive and lasting effects of staff training and reduces institutional memory;
both of which severely constrain public sector capacity development.
Over the period under review, Ricardo Maduro (PNH) was President from 2002 to 2005
and Manuel Zelaya (PLH) won the next election and was installed president in January
2006 until his arrest by the army on 28 June 2009 and his forced expatriation to Costa Rica.
This “coup d’Etat”3 stemmed from a constitutional crisis whereby the President wanted to
organise a referendum on a change of the Constitution whilst the Supreme Court ruled it
anti-constitutional. More generally the crisis was fuelled by the opposition between
different interest groups, an opposition exacerbated by the more leftist ruling of Zelaya
compared to its predecessors4 and a shift of international alliance towards the ALBA
countries5 and Hugo Chávez from Venezuela.
The period immediately following was marked with political unrest under the leadership of
President Roberto Micheletti (from the same liberal party as Zelaya - PLH), sworn in as
President by the National Congress for a term lasting till January 2010. At first no country
recognised this de facto government. All donors suspended official aid with Honduras
(which has cost the country around 6% of its annual GDP according to an IMF
publication6). Demonstrations in favour of Zelaya were severely repressed, constitutional
rights were suspended (personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of movement,
habeas corpus and freedom of association and assembly), an opposition radio station and a
television station were closed, a number of opposition journalists and unionists were
arrested and some were found dead.
Porfirio Lobo Sosa (PNH) won the general election held as scheduled in November 2009.
He took office in January 2010 and was promptly recognised by the US. The European
3 On 7 July 2011, the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CVR) concluded that the events of 28 June 2009 were
« a coup d’Etat against the executive ».  It also stated that the decisions taken by Manuel Zelaya notably the
organisation of a referendum that same 28 June 2009, violated the Constitution.  Furthermore, prior to these Truth
Commission’s conclusions, an agreement was signed in May 2011 between the former President Zelaya and the
current President Lobo thanks to the mediation efforts of the presidents of Colombia and Venezuela; in this
agreement, the events of 28 June 2009 are described as a “Golpe de Estado”.
4 E.g. In December 2008 the president declared a 60% increase of the minimum wage, which met strong opposition
from the business sector.
5 The “Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas” is a commercial and political alliance joined by Cuba, Venezuela,
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador and 3 small Caribbean islands. It was briefly joined by Honduras, before the 2009 events.
6 IMF : Honduras : Request for a Stand-By Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility_Staff report; Press Release
on the Executive Board decision; and Statement by the Executive Director for Honduras, 2010
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Union and the United States resumed their cooperation in March 2010 and most western
countries slowly did the same. However the new government still faces the opposition of
several Latin American countries (such as ALBA countries and Brazil).
Until now, the slow return to a constitutional State has not improved the human rights
situation. In 2010, there were 47 attacks, including 18 murders, against journalists, human
rights activists or political opponents.7 All these crimes remain unsolved at present.
2.1.2 Social background
 Poverty and extreme poverty8 rates decreased between 2005 and 2008 but have
significantly increased since 2009. In 2010 they represented 65.0% and 42.4% of the
population respectively.
 In 2007 (latest data available), Honduras had the highest rates of inequality in Central
America and some of the highest in the world: the Gini index was 55.39. The poorest
10 percent of the population shared 0.7% of National Income, while the richest 10%
shared 42.2% thus meaning that the income of the highest deciles was 60 times the
income of the lowest. No trend towards decreasing inequality could be identified10.
 Crime and violence are a major concern in the country. According to the UNDP, a
preliminary estimation for 2010 gives a rate of 72 murders per 100,000 inhabitants11,
the highest in the region and one of the highest in the world. An estimated 60% of
homicides are related to drug trafficking and organised crime.
 Although Honduras has registered steady progress in key education indicators during
the last decade and although education’s share of GDP is much higher than the
regional average, these efforts have not resulted in superior education outcomes
compared to its neighbours. The heavy weight of education in the GDP is mainly
related to the share of spending on teacher salaries, which, although already high, has
increased sharply in recent years.
 Health expenditure has increased as a proportion of GDP and in 2007 it amounted to
US$ 107 per capita (current US dollars). Honduras has demonstrated progress in most
national level health, nutrition and population indicators. It has reduced neonatal
mortality, infant and child mortality, and to some extent chronic malnutrition.
Significant gaps remain in terms of access and outcomes between rural and urban areas,
regions, poor and wealthy segments of the population. The health sector has been
more successful in advancing reforms than other sectors.
7 Paulo A. Paranagua, « Les violations des droits de l’homme n’ont pas été sanctionnées au Honduras », Le Monde, 23 décembre
2010, p.7.
8 The extreme poverty rate is the proportion of the population which has a per capita income below the basic food
basket (who cannot even cover their food necessity).
9 The Gini index lies between 0 and 100. A value of 0 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality. Other
values in Central America are: El Salvador: 49,7; Guatemala: 53,7; Nicaragua: 52,3.
10 UNDP Human Development Statistic Index, 2009
11 In 2004 this rate was 46 murders/100,000 inhabitants. This rate would have increased 72% in 6 years.
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2.1.3 Economic background
Honduras is a lower middle income country with a GNI per capita of US$1740 (current US
dollars) in 2009. According to 2009 UNDP data, it ranks 112th out of 182 countries on an
index scale of human development (HDI)12. The share of manufacturing (essentially
“maquila” or offshore assembly products) in GDP is almost double that of agriculture. The
service sector is dominated by financial intermediation. Honduras is a very open economy,
with exports and imports accounting for around 40 and 50 percent of GDP respectively.
The inflow of remittance or remesas was US$ 369 per capita in 2007 which represented
almost 25% of GDP of the same year13. This high dependence on international trade, on a
sector (maquila) subject to strong competition from Asia, on supply and demand in one
particular country (the USA), and on remittances, makes the Honduran economy
particularly fragile as it is very exposed to external shocks.
Some other economic characteristics are as follows:
 GDP per capita at constant prices stagnated from 1981 to 2002 ( 21 years), but from
2002 to 2008 it increased at an average rate of 3.5 percent a year. It declined sharply in
2009 due to the international crisis and the acute internal political crisis.
 The population growth rate is high but is slowing down (from 3.3 percent per
annum at the beginning of the eighties to 2.1 percent per annum in 2009), which
illustrates the entrance of Honduras into the “second phase” of the demographic
transition (a slower birth rate). Around 1.5 million Hondurans are estimated to be
living abroad (20 percent of the population), mainly in the USA.
 The main characteristics of the agricultural sector are the following:
- Its two main export crops are coffee and bananas.
- Its share in GDP and employment has been declining slowly and represented 14
percent of GDP and 39 percent of employment in 2009.
- A strong land concentration process is taking place: half of the 508,000 farms of
less than 5 ha existing in 1999 had disappeared by 2009.
- The area and production of African palm oil is increasing rapidly, reaching 14% of
cropped area and 380,000MT in 2008.
 The maquila sector has declined significantly in recent years in term of exports, value
added and employment: it moved from 134,000 employees in 2007 to 104,000 in 2009.
Honduras has been unable to move up the added-value chain of economic
development towards segments that are not as heavily dependent on low wages and/or
restricted labour rights.
Honduras benefited from a third consecutive Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in early 2004, but
this arrangement was allowed to expire in February 2007. In April 2008 the IMF approved
a 12-month Stand-By Agreement for approximately US$ 63.5m but the conditions were
12 This is approximately the same level as Indonesia or Bolivia, but higher than Nicaragua or Guatemala.
13 In comparison, ODA per capita reached US$ 65 in 2007, or only 18% of remittances.
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never met by Honduras which thus went off-track. A new 18-month stand-by agreement
was approved in October 2010 for approximately US$201.8m.
Honduras reached the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’s Completion
point in April 2005 and benefited from a US$ 3.14m debt relief from 2005 to 2007.
2.1.4 Environmental background
Honduras is heavily exposed to natural disasters. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch killed at least
6,000 people, destroyed 70% of the roads and virtually every bridge in the country,
destroyed 33,000 homes and damaged 55,000 others, leaving 20% of the population
without shelter. One consequence of Hurricane Mitch was an increased awareness of the
importance of environmental issues. The problem is aggravated by a highly skewed land
distribution, unsustainable small farming systems, illegal logging and weak administrative
capacity. As a consequence 44 percent of the total land suitable for agriculture is seriously
eroded and deforestation continues.
2.1.5 National development policy
No National Development Plan was published during most of the reference period.
However the GoH approved a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in August
2001 which was updated in 2003 and monitored until 2006. The plan was not formally
endorsed by the Zelaya Government in 2006. In November 2009 the two main parties
competing in the presidential election issued a joint development plan called “Visión de
País 2010-2038” which in turn contained a shorter-term plan called “Plan de Nación
2010-2022”. This last plan is intended to replace the PRSP.
2.2 EC cooperation framework14
2.2.1 The (Sub-)Regional Cooperation Framework
The European Commission (EC) has been in relation with Latin and Central American
countries since the 1960s, but strengthened ties significantly following the entry of Spain
and Portugal to the European Community in 1986. Relations have consisted of policy
dialogue, preferential trade agreements, and a cooperation framework15. It is necessary to
differentiate between regional level (Latin America), sub-regional level (Central America),
and bilateral level (Honduras) cooperation. Cooperation at (sub-)regional levels is described
in this section; the bilateral level is addressed in Section 2.2.2 below.
The 1992 ALA Regulation16 from the European Council relating to Asia and Latin America
provided a legal basis for the main regional, sub-regional and bilateral budget lines and
14 See Annex 3 for more details
15 Sources: Evaluation of EC regional strategy in Latin America (DRN, 2005), Evaluation of EC regional cooperation in
Central America (DRN, 2007)
16 European Council Regulation EEC n°443/92 of February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and
economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America
Evaluation of the EC’s co-operation with Honduras
ADE-DRN
Final Report April 2012 Page 8
established priority sectors. This Regulation gave priority to strengthening the cooperation
framework and to promoting sustainable development. Social, economic and democratic
stability were reinforced through an institutional dialogue and economic and financial
cooperation. It was replaced in 2006 by the Regulation establishing the EC’s Development
Cooperation Instrument (DCI)17, which provides a new framework for the main regional,
sub-regional and bilateral budget lines and defines current priority sectors.
At the level of Central America (sub-regional), a policy dialogue specific to Central American
countries was initiated by the EC and the EU MS in the 1980s. During its first years the so-
called “San José Dialogue” targeted the peace-building process and democratisation of
the region. This process was also supported by a significant increase in development aid
and adoption of GSP measures (Generalised System of Preferences – see below). During
the 1990s the EU-Central America (EU-CA) dialogue evolved to integrate new issues such
as regional integration and disaster prevention and rehabilitation. In 2002 the EU-CA
dialogue was renewed in the XVIII Ministerial Conference of San José, and was confirmed
and completed in 2004 at the EU/LAC Guadalajara Summit with a focus on social
cohesion. At the 2002 Conference the following themes were considered important for
alignment of future cooperation:
 Democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and civil society
 Regional integration
 Economic relations between the two regions
 Security
 Environment and natural disasters
 Political consultation on international matters of common interest
There have been discussions since 1994 on preferential trade agreements with Central
America. A EU-CA Association Agreement was signed at the Euro-Latin American
Summit in Madrid on May 19, 2010. Eight rounds of negotiations were held between
October 2007 and March 2010. The June 2009 political events in Honduras delayed the
process because meetings had to be postponed and because a debate started on whether to
exclude Honduras from the negotiation process. In the event, Honduras’ presence was
maintained and negotiations successfully ended at the beginning of 2010.
The EC started structuring its cooperation framework with Central America in 1998 with a
first Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) covering the period 1998-2000. The subsequent
regional strategies (EC-SICA MoU for 2000-2006, 2002-2006 RSP, 2007-2013 RSP) have
shown a clear continuum, mainly in support of regional integration.
From 2000 until 2005, there were 4 main regional programmes that related to Honduras in
the three sectors of the environment, food security and local development. These were the
PREVDA on preventing environmental degradation (€20m committed), the ZONAF on
17 Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a
financing instrument for development cooperation
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the development of areas at the borders (€40m committed), the Bi-national programme
SLV-HN (€30m committed) to promote development at the border between Salvador and
Honduras, and the PRESANCA regional programme on food security and nutrition
Central America (€12m committed).
2.2.2 The EC’s cooperation strategy with Honduras
This section presents a brief overview of the EC cooperation strategy with Honduras over
the evaluation period 2002-2009. This strategy was laid down in the following documents:
 EC Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the period 2002-2006; and
 EC Country Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2013.
A Mid Term Review of the 2007-2013 CSP with proposals and recommendations was
finalised recently.
Earlier EC cooperation strategies consisted of two succinct documents: the Mid-term
Strategy for 1996-1997 and the Country Strategy Paper for 1998-2000, which were
described in the 2004 evaluation of EC cooperation with Honduras that covered the period
1992-200218.
The EC and the Government of Honduras signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) on 26 March 2001 that covered the period 2000-2006. It is the official basis for the
cooperation, consisting of a signed agreement binding the two parties (unlike the CSPs
which are EC documents on its strategy). The EC’s Country Strategy Paper for 2002-2006
corresponds in general terms to the broad guidelines of the 2001 MoU. No other MoU has
been signed with Honduras since then.
2002-2006 CSP
The CSP for the period 2002-2006 specified that EC action aims at substantial and visible
contribution to the country’s poverty reduction strategy set out in the 2001 PRSP. The
CSP stated that there is a need for concentration of efforts through targeting in a limited
number of sectors (with three focal sectors compared to the five sectors included in the
MoU) where the EC could have a comparative advantage.
The three focal sectors were defined as follows:
 Sustainable management of natural resources (integrated management of water resources);
 Support to local development and decentralisation (decentralised management of urban
services); and
 Support to the education sector (secondary education);
The National Indicative Programme (NIP) envisaged a total of €121m for these three focal
sectors (45%, 26% and 21% respectively), with an additional reserve of €10m, besides
18 Evaluation de la stratégie de coopération de la Commission européenne avec le Honduras, MWH, 2004
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contributions on other budget lines of €12m for debt reduction (HIPC) and €119m for the
post-Hurricane Mitch PRRAC reconstruction programme.
2007-2013 CSP
The CSP for the period 2007-2013 also highlighted the principle of concentrating aid in
sectors where the EC offered an added-value, but added explicitly considerations from the
2005 European Consensus on Development (e.g. focus on social cohesion) and from the
2005 Paris Declaration (notably donor harmonisation and alignment with the domestic
agenda).
Three focal sectors were determined as follows:
 Human and social development – Making the PRSP a catalyst for social cohesion
(global budget support to the PRSP’s education and health sectors);
 The environment and sustainable management of natural resources – promoting
forestry reform; and
 Justice and public security.
The National Indicative Programme (NIP) envisaged a total of €223m for these three focal
sectors over the 7-year period, of which €127.5m for 2007-2010 (NIP-1) and €95.5m for
2011-2013 (NIP-2). Respective distribution between focal sectors was of 50%, 30% and
20% for the entire period 2007-2013.
As shown in the synthetic table below, the 2007-2013 CSP has shifted focus compared to
the 2002-2006 CSP, by abandoning direct support to certain areas (decentralisation), adding
new areas (justice and public security), and changing focus within two areas: from water to
forestry in natural resources, and from direct support to secondary education to general
budget support to social sectors (education and health).
Table 1: EC focal sectors by period
CSP 2002-2006 CSP 2007-2013
 Decentralisation  Justice and public security
 Secondary education  Budget support to PRSP for
education and health
 Integrated management
of natural resources: Water
 Integrated management of
natural resources: Forestry
EC cooperation objectives per period are further detailed in Section 2.3 on the
Intervention Logic.
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2.2.3 The implementation of the strategy: Inventory19
The EC committed a total of €371m to projects and programmes in Honduras over the
evaluation period 2002-2009 on resources relating to external co-operation (DG RELEX,
DG DEV and EuropeAid, as from now on referred to as EC support)20. Out of the total
of €371m, €119m was allocated to the post-Hurricane Mitch PRRAC reconstruction
programme. It represents 32% of total EC support to Honduras over the evaluation
period.
The figure below presents the chronology of EC support between 2002 and 2009.
Figure 2: EC commitments to Honduras, €m, 2002-2009 – per year
(1) For 2000 and 2001, only figures for PRRAC and FORCUENCAS are presented and added to 2002-2009 commitments given their magnitude and their
inclusion in the 2002 2006 CSP.
Note. Figures present commitments or closest available data. Amounts committed for programmes in white have, to date, not been contracted or have not been
disbursed.
Source: ADE analysis based on EC database for external cooperation (CRIS)
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Whilst funds for 41 interventions21 in total were committed between 2002-2009, the EC’s
cooperation with Honduras is in fact characterised by the prevalence of several large
interventions. Indeed, commitments made for the 5 largest interventions amount to
almost three quarters (74%) of total EC support to Honduras between 2002 and 2009 or,
excluding the PRAAC, to almost half (49%) of total EC support.
19 See Annex 3 for more details
20 Resources from the EC humanitarian office ECHO and other EC Directorates General are not included (falling out
of the scope of this evaluation)
21 Decisions specific to Honduras, and contracts specific to Honduras but released from global and regional decisions.
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The following pre-2002 interventions have been included in the inventory of EC support
to Honduras22; the magnitude of those programmes and their inclusion in the 2002-2006
CSP justified this choice:
 the €119m PRRAC23 ; and
 the €34m FORCUENCAS intervention to strengthen the local management of natural
resources in the Patuca and Choluteca river basins.
From 2002 to 2009, funds for the following large interventions were committed:
 in 2003, €28m for the Apoyo a la educación media en Honduras (PRAEMHO) ;
 in 2004, €34m for the Programa de apoyo a la descentralización en Honduras
(PROADES, budget support) ;
 in 2006, €25m for the Gestión Sostenible de Recursos Naturales y Cuencas del
Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano en el Atlántico Hondureño (PROCORREDOR) ;
and
 in 2008, €60.5m for the Apoyo Presupuestario a la Estrategia de Reducción de Pobreza
en los campos de la educación y de la salud (APERP, budget support).
In terms of payments, as of May 2010, 93% of funds committed by the EC had been
contracted (or 52.5% excluding PRAAC) of which 81% had been paid (€234m payments
on the €288m contracted for the interventions reported in CRIS) 24. Payment levels were
limited for the following four interventions in particular:
 Two interventions decided in 2008, the APERP budget support of €60.5m and the
PAAPIR (“Proyecto de Apoyo a la Modernización de la Administración Pública y a la
Integración Regional”) of €5m, had not yet commenced as of May 2010 (APERP was
signed and the first disbursement made at the end of 2010).
 Two interventions encountered important disbursement delays: PASS (“Programa de
Apoyo al Sector Seguridad”) of €9m decided in 2007: only 1% had been contracted by
2010; and PROADES budget support (decided in 2004): less than €14m out of the
total of €34m committed had been disbursed by 2010.
In terms of sectors supported by EC funding, the figure below shows that in total,
14 different sectors were supported with 92% of the support being concentrated in 6 major
sectors by one or two large programmes, as detailed in the figure below. The shaded
tones of the pie’s shares show the extent to which interventions have been disbursed (white
shows that the intervention had not yet started by May 2010).
22 Additionally, the PRAP programme (“Apoyo a la Modernización de la Administración Pública en Honduras”) is
presented with 2002 commitments: it was initially approved in 1998, but was not contracted before 2002, on the basis
of a revised financing agreement.
23 The commitment for the overall PRRAC structure dates from 2000, although contracts for underlying programmes
or activities have been signed during the whole evaluation period.
24 Payments in CRIS are aggregated disbursement data from signature of contract to date of extraction (12.05.2010), for
contracts signed since 2001. Less information is thus available on payments vis-à-vis commitments (e.g. breakdown
per year).
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Figure 3: EC funding to Honduras, commitments, 2002-2009 – per sector
supported
2%
8%
8%
9%
17%
33%
2%4%
17%
Rehabilitation
€ 119m
(all PRRAC)
Security
€ 9 m (all PASS)
Environment
€ 63m
(54% FORCUENCAS and
40% PROCORREDOR)
Poverty reduction
€ 63m
(97% APERP BS)
Decentralisation
€ 34 m BS
(all PROADES)
Education
€ 30m (93% PRAEMHO)
Mod. of. pub. admin
€ 9 m
Food security
€ 28m (50% PASAH  BS and
42.5% Facility for rapid response
to soaring food prices)
(1) Civil society, Rural development, Local development,Democracy&Human rights,Energy.
Note. For 2000 and 2001, only figures for PRRAC and FORCUENCAS are presented and added to 2002-2009 commitments given theirmagnitude and their inclusion in the
2002 2006 CSP.
Note. Figures present commitments or closest available data. Amounts committed for programmes in white have, to date, not been contracted or have not been disbursed.
Source: ADE analysis based on EC database for external cooperation (CRIS)
Other (1)
€ 15 m
Total
excl.PRRAC:
€252m
Total:
€371m
In terms of sources of funding, the table below shows that:
 86% of commitments originated from the EC geographical budget line ALA (incl.
DCI-ALA). It was to support 20 interventions (decisions and contracts) as presented in
the table below.
 In terms of number of interventions supported, the thematic budget line NGO-Co-
financing (incl. DCI-NSAPVD) was to fund almost half of interventions committed
(36/80), which however represented only 4% of total amounts committed.
Table 2: EC commitments to Honduras, 2002-2009 – per EC budget line
Commitments* in €m Share # Interventions
ALA (incl. DCI-ALA) 320 86% 20
FOOD (incl. DCI-FOOD) 28.5 8% 10
NGO (incl. DCI-NSAPVD) 16 4% 36
ENV 3 1% 4
EDUCATION 2.2 1% 1
EIDHR 0.6 0,2% 9
TOTAL 371 100% 80
Note.PRRAC (2000, ALA) and FORCUENCAS (2001, ALA) have been included given theirmagnitude and their inclusion in the 2002 2006 CSP.
Note. Figures present commitments or closest available data.
Source: ADE analysis based on EC database for external cooperation (CRIS)
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2.3 EC intervention logic
This section provides a brief overview of the intervention logic of the EC cooperation with
Honduras during the evaluation period, which is presented in detail in Annex 4. The
intervention logic delineates the set of objectives against which the EC interventions are
assessed; it presents the hierarchy of objectives and expected impact pursued by the EC25.
It is based on the official documents that set out the EC strategies in the country, in
particular the two Country Strategy Papers for Honduras, covering the periods 2002-2006
and 2007-2013.
The intervention logic is presented in the figure below in the form of a compiled expected
impact diagram. It differentiates between four levels of expected impact which correspond
to four levels of objectives, and the intended activities for attaining the results:
 Global impact (corresponding to global objectives, in the long term);
 Intermediate impact (corresponding to intermediate objectives, in the medium term);
 Specific impact (corresponding to specific objectives);
 Results (corresponding to operational objectives);
 Activities
The hierarchical links for attaining these expected impacts are made explicit in the figure.
Additionally, the diagram shows other EC instruments with their own objectives and
expected impact, such as the post-Hurricane Mitch PRRAC reconstruction programme,
thematic budget lines, and regional programmes, which also benefited Honduras.
The figure also shows the main areas of the intervention logic which are covered by the
eight evaluation questions.
Details on the different intervention logic diagrams and their expected impacts, results and
activities are provided in Annex 4 of this report.
25 Unlike reconstructing the intervention logic of a project, where the logical framework provides the rationale, in this
case the intervention logic of a country strategy consists of a number of objectives and expected impact expressed in
subsequent strategy documents over the years. The evaluators attempted to stay as close to the texts as possible, in
line with the enunciated strategy. As such, the intervention logic reflects the EC overall intentions and approach in an
aggregate form, and is not oriented to an analysis of specific interventions or contributions.
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Figure 4: Expected Impact Diagram, compiled for 2002-2006 and 2007-2013: Coverage by Evaluation Questions26
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26 Boxes in white and shaded tones indicate that there have been respectively no corresponding contracts or limited disbursement so far. Ellipses in red indicate the evaluation
questions (EQs) covering the main areas of the intervention logic; the pink ellipses refer to the indirect coverage of decentralization in two EQs focusing on other sectors.
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2.4 Other donors’ cooperation
Honduras received a total of $4,472m net disbursements of official development aid
(ODA) from the donor community over the period 2002-2008, according to OECD-DAC
data. In 2002, ODA represented 5.9% of Honduras’ GDP that year. In 2008, this share
dropped to 4.0% of Honduras’ GDP. In 2008, average ODA per capita was $74.8.
Figure 5: Donors’ ODA to Honduras, 2002-2008 (net disbursements
in current prices, USD)
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The EU, represented by its Member States and by the European Commission, disbursed a
total of $1,475m worth of official development aid between 2002-2008. This represents a
third of total ODA received by Honduras across that period. Amongst EU member states,
Spain represented almost half of total support. The US and Japan, the other largest single
country donors with Spain, represented 18% and 12% of total ODA respectively.
Evaluation of the EC’s co-operation with Honduras
ADE-DRN
Final Report April 2012 Page 17
3. Methodology
This section presents the main features of the methodological approach for the evaluation,
in particular (i) the evaluation process; (ii) the data collection method; and (iii) the
challenges and limitations of this exercise.
3.1 Evaluation process
The evaluation was based on a structured process consisting of a sequence of distinct and
well-defined phases. The figure below provides an overview of this process, specifying for
each phase the activities carried out and the deliverables produced. It also specifies the
meetings with the Reference Group (RG), with the EU Delegation in Honduras and the
Regional EU Delegation in Nicaragua, and the dissemination seminar in Honduras.
Figure 6: Evaluation phases
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3.2 Data collection
The approach for data collection and analysis followed a structured process, also shown
in the figure above. During the Structuring stage, information on the national context
and EC cooperation was collected and studied, including on EC cooperation objectives and
funding in the country. During the Desk study stage, documentary sources available on a
desk basis were collected and reviewed by the evaluation team, and interviews were
undertaken with EC Headquarters’ staff. During the Field phase, the team complemented
the collection of documentary evidence and undertook visits to selected projects and a
large number of interviews with a variety of stakeholders. Information was hence
triangulated as far as possible by collecting it through different types of sources. This data
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collection and analysis approach aimed at ensuring that the data collected was such as to
allow providing useful, sound and credible information on the Indicators, the basic
components of the JCs and EQ, while being adapted to the nature of the information that
had to be retrieved and taking into account the evaluation’s calendar and budget.
The data collection and analysis were based on a structured framework consisting of
8 Evaluation Questions and their 42 Judgement Criteria and 185 Indicators (see Annex 5), in
accordance with the methodological framework defined at the beginning of the evaluation.
Findings of this evaluation are presented per Evaluation Question at the level of the
Judgement Criteria (see Chapter 4), based on data collected at the level of the Indicators,
which is presented in a so-called “Data Collection Grid” (provided in Annex 8).
The evaluation tools selected for this purpose and their use are detailed in the table below,
which also refer to the annexes providing further details. These tools have been selected
taking account of the different sectors and fields of investigation and relating indicators.
They enabled collecting quantitative data (e.g. statistics, disbursement levels), specific
studies, informed views from EC staff and key local stakeholders involved, opinions from
final beneficiaries, and on-site observation and verification. Their combined use provided
the required basis for collecting, triangulating and analysing information, as detailed
thereafter.
Table 3: Evaluation tools used
Evaluation
Phase
Evaluation
Tool
What was it and what was it used for?
Desk
Statistical
data
gathering
Analysis of the EC’s CRIS database to provide an inventory of the funding
to Honduras over the evaluation period. See Annex 3 for details
Effects
(impact)
diagram
This allowed provision of graphical presentations of the Intervention
Logic of EC cooperation in Honduras, with indication of the different
levels of expected effects over the two different evaluation periods (with
additionally a compiled diagram covering both periods) and their linkages
with the EC’s main interventions. It clarified the EC cooperation
objectives overall and in each key cooperation sector. It served as a
reference framework, among other things, to define the focus of the
evaluation. See Annex 4 for details.
Desk &
Field
Document
analysis
A total of 195 documents provided information for this evaluation. Three
main categories of documents have been collected and studied:
- Context information on the situation and its evolution of the country
and the region, including for instance national statistics, GoH policies,
sector studies, etc. This information is necessary to understand the main
issues addressed, or that should have been addressed, by the EC support,
and to have an overview of the evolution of the situation of the country in
relation to these issues so as to form a first idea about the possible
contribution of the EC support to the observed trends;
- General information on the EC cooperation with Honduras, e.g. EC
strategy and programming documents, donor coordination document;
- Information on the selection of interventions for desk and field study. A
set of interventions (provided below) was identified and selected at the
beginning of this evaluation for end-to-end analysis during the desk and
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Evaluation
Phase
Evaluation
Tool
What was it and what was it used for?
field phases. Available documentation on these interventions has been
screened and studied in detail at the level of every relevant Judgement
Criterion and Indicator.
See Annex 9 with the full bibliography.
Interviews Interviews enabled to collect the views of a total of 97 stakeholders.
Different types of interviews have been used: open, structured and (for
most of them) semi-structured.  Numerous individual interviews have
been organised and also some grouped interviews.
See Annex 10 with the list of persons met.
Telephone
interviews
and video-
conference
Most interviews were face-to-face, in Honduras or in Brussels, but a few
telephone interviews have also been conducted when a face-to-face
interview was not possible or to check specific issues. Video-conference
has been used for meetings with Reference Group members based in
Honduras and in Nicaragua.
Field
On site
visits and
verificatio
ns
On-site visits (project visits) allowed examining the outputs of EC
interventions and better understanding of specific issues. They also
permitted verification of information provided in documentary sources.
They further allowed conducting of interviews with operators and
sometimes final beneficiaries.
Synthesis
Multi-
criteria
analysis
Was used to appraise impact in different sectors according to several
criteria.
The table below provides additionally details on the rationale for the selection of tools and
the sectors or fields of investigation for which they will be used. Details on the specific
tools and sources of information per Evaluation Question are provided in Annex 5.
Table 4: Data collection tools per EQ
Selected
interventions
Overall EQ 1
Nat Res.
Strategy
EQ 2
Nat Res.
Achiev.
EQ 3
Food
Security
EQ 4
Second.
Education
EQ 5
Public
Security
EQ 6
LRRD
EQ 7
Budget
Support
EQ 8
Aid
Modalit.
Statistical data
gathering
Effects
(impact)
diagram
Document
analysis
Interviews
Telephone
interviews and
video-confer.
On site visits
and
verifications
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The selection of interventions for desk and field study consisted of the EC contributions
to the following programmes:
Table 5: Selection of interventions27
Name - short Name - full Commitm. Year
PRRAC Programa de Reconstrucción Regional para
América Central - Subprograma Honduras
€119m 2000
APERP Apoyo Presupuestario a la Estrategia de
Reducción de Pobreza en los campos de la
educación y de la salud
€61m 2008
FORCUENCAS Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Local de los
Recursos Naturales en las. Cuencas de los
Ríos Patuca y Choluteca
€34m 2001
PROADES Programa de apoyo a la descentralización
en Honduras
€34m 2004
PRAEMHO Apoyo a la educación media en Honduras €28m 2003
PROCORREDOR Gestión Sostenible de Recursos Naturales y
Cuencas del Corredor Biológico
Mesoamericano en el Atlántico Hondureño
€25m 2006
PASAH Programa de apoyo a la seguridad
alimentaria en Honduras
€14m 2004
PASS Programa de Apoyo al Sector Seguridad en
Honduras
€9m 2007
EFA Apoyo a la educación primaria en
Honduras (Education For All)
€2m 2006
FAO Semilla Producción y comercialización de semilla
artesanal mejorada y diversificada
€1m 2003
Bosques y Agua Protección y manejo sostenible de bosques
y zonas productivas de agua en el
Occidente de Honduras
€1m 2006
This selection represents a large proportion of the EC’s contributions (88%) and covers the
most relevant dimensions for this evaluation, that is in terms of sectors, periods, size and
status of projects, and aid modalities, viz.:
 88% of total commitments (€327m out of €371m);
 all interventions larger than €10m;
 all budget support interventions (PROADES, PASAH, and APERP);
 all EQ sectors (Secondary education, Natural resources, Food security, Public Security,
and LRRD);
 the entire 2002-2009 evaluation period;
 on-going and closed interventions;
 a variety of project sizes (€1m-€119m);
27 Showing EC commitments and years of signature of the financing agreement.
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 7 types of aid modalities (budget support, decentralised to the GoH, implemented by
NGOs, basket funding, channelled through the UN, and PRRAC’s specific set-up); and
 4 EC budget lines (ALA, FOOD, EDU, ENV).
In addition to the eight large interventions, three smaller projects have been included in
this selection to cover additional aid modalities (basket funding with Apoyo EFA, delegated
management with FAO Semilla, and NGO implementation through Bosques y Agua) and for
providing additional evidence in the fields of food security (FAO Semilla) and management
of natural resources (Bosques y Agua).
Once all the information had been collected, at the end of the field phase, it has been
analysed and synthesised in a data collection grid (provided in Annex 8) with a view to
constructing answers to the Evaluation Questions and, from those answers, Conclusions
and Recommendations. Information has been gathered mainly at the detailed level of
indicators. The information from each source has been critically examined to confirm its
validity (in many cases this had already taken place at an earlier stage when the information
was gathered) and has been crosschecked to see whether sources confirm each other or
not. Where necessary, supplementary data sources have been sought to increase reliability
and credibility of the findings. Once the different indicators had been informed, aggregate
analysis took place and it was decided to what extent the judgment criteria were validated
or not. Answers to the Evaluation Question were based on the validation of these criteria.
Conclusions and Recommendations were derived from the answers to the different EQs
(see chapters 4, 5 and 6 for details on the specific logical linkages for each of them).
3.3 Challenges and limitations
A first challenge for this evaluation was the difficult political context in Honduras
following the June 2009 events. Most countries interrupted their cooperation (see section
2.1.1 above), including the EC which resumed its cooperation in March 2010. This political
context hence affected EC cooperation during the (2002-2009) evaluation period. It also
posed a challenge for this evaluation in that it complicated access to key information
sources and stakeholders involved during the period. It also implied particular sensitivity on
certain issues, for instance on public security or on references to the political context. As
for the typical challenge of data collection in this kind of evaluations covering a long (eight
year) period, notably in terms of institutional memory and availability of information, the
approach to address this challenge consisted first in multiplying and triangulating the
sources of information for collecting data, confronting information, verifying hypotheses
and confirming preliminary findings through e.g. documents, interviews, field visits,
debriefing meetings, etc. (see for instance the information in the Data Collection Grid in Annexe 8).
Evaluating budget support was also (and still is) a key challenge, as widely recognised by
donor agencies and the evaluation community. Budget support (BS) is indeed a
contribution to the implementation of the policy and public spending actions of a partner
government. Evaluating budget support is still in an exploratory phase, which entails
teething problems and room for interpretation. The present report follows the current EC
methodological requirements in this regard, which consists of Step One of the
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methodology for budget support evaluation presented in the Issue Paper of May 2008
('Methodologies for Evaluations of Budget Support Operations at Country level', by
E.Caputo (DRN), A.Lawson (ODI), M.v.d.Linde (ECORYS))28. Step 1 of the methodology
is focused on the relevance of the inputs provided, the direct outputs of these inputs, and
the quality and adequacy of the changes supported in the government systems (induced
outputs).29 Step One thus excludes the appreciation of outcomes (level 4) and impacts
(Level 5). The present evaluation focuses accordingly its questioning of budget support on
the adaptation of the instrument to the Honduran macroeconomic, political and
administrative context (see EQ 7 in Annex 5 and the response to this EQ in section 4.7).
Another general challenge relates to this type of exercise: a strategic-level country
evaluation is difficult per se. It requires the analysis of a country cooperation framework
which spans many sectors, many instruments and implementation modalities and a long
period of time.  It has to go beyond the evaluation of single interventions by drawing on
the analysis of a sample of interventions to inform the manner in which the cooperation
framework was implemented and the degree of success it obtained. This challenge is
tackled mainly by the specific structured methodological approach of the Joint Evaluation
Unit, based notably on the reconstruction of the EC intervention logics, the definition of
Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators, and the determination of a
selection of interventions for the desk and field study (see above).
28 The proposed evaluation methodology consists of a five-level analytical framework (inputs, direct outputs,
government strategy (induced) outputs, outcomes and impacts, which is applied in a sequence of three
steps/components. Step One consists of an assessment of the inputs, direct outputs and induced outputs clearly
attributable to budget support. Step Two focuses on those outcomes and impacts of the government strategy that
GBS/SBS intends to support. Step Three deals with an exploration of the linkages between the GBS/SBS processes
and the outcomes and impact of the government strategy.
29 “Step One covers the first three levels of the evaluation framework as follows: (i) GBS/SBS inputs by donors defined
as including funds, policy dialogue, conditionality, technical assistance/capacity building (TA/CB), alignment to
government policies and systems, harmonisation between donors, (ii) direct outputs (improvements expected in
relationship between external assistance and the national budget and policy processes), and (iii) induced outputs
(positive changes expected in the financing and institutional framework for public spending and public policy, and
consequent improvements in public policy management and service delivery).”
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4. Answers to the Evaluation Questions
The answers to the eight Evaluation Questions are presented in this chapter. Three
different levels have been used for providing three levels of reading:
 Answers to each Evaluation Question (EQ) provided in the form of summary boxes;
 Findings and analysis on which each answer is based are provided in the remainder of
the text – indication is provided on the Judgement Criteria (JC) on which they are
based;
 Facts on which the findings are based are provided in the Data Collection Grid in
Annexe 8, with systematic indication of the information sources. These facts consist of
specific information for assessment at the level of the indicators (I), under the
Evaluation Questions and Judgement Criteria to which the different sections of this
chapter refer.
The table below provides a synthetic overview of the set of Evaluation Questions.
Table 6: Overview of the Evaluation Questions
EQ 1 Natural resource strategy
EQ 2 Natural resource achievements
EQ 3 Food Security
EQ 4 Secondary education
EQ 5 Public Security
EQ 6 LRRD30
EQ 7 Budget Support
EQ 8 Aid modalities
Details on the Evaluation Questions as such and their Judgement Criteria and Indicators
are provided in Annex 5, along with the justification for and coverage of each question.
They were defined and agreed at the beginning of the evaluation during the Structuring
stage. They cover the main sectors/themes of EC cooperation and the main EC criteria for
the evaluative questioning (relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, efficiency,
coherence and EC added-value), and additionally cross-cutting issues and the key issues of
coherence, coordination and complementarity (see the table on the next page). They formed
together with the intervention logic the backbone for the entire evaluation.
30 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
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Table 7: Coverage of evaluation criteria and key issues by the EQs31
Evaluation
criteria
EQ 1
Nat Res.
Strategy
EQ 2
Nat Res.
Achiev.
EQ 3
Food
Security
EQ 4
Secondary
Education
EQ 5
Public
Security
EQ 6
LRRD
EQ 7
Budget
Support
EQ 8
Aid
Modalities
Relevance
Effectiveness
Impact
Sustainability
Efficiency
Coherence
EC added
value
Key issues
Cross-cutting
issues
3Cs
Largely covered Treated
4.1/4.2 EQ 1/ EQ 2 on Natural Resource Strategy and
Achievements
EQ1: To what extent has the EC approach to natural resources been relevant in
the national context and ongoing dynamics, and contributed to the
strengthening of the public strategy in the sector?
EQ2: To what extent has integrated and sustainable management of natural
resources been strengthened and to what extent has the EC contributed to
it?
Sustainable management of natural resources is a focal sector for EC cooperation in both the 2002-2006
and the 2007-2013 CSPs. The EC has provided direct or indirect support in this field through various
interventions, but primarily through the €34m FORCUENCAS and the €25m PROCORREDOR
programmes, committed in 2001 and 2006 respectively. Both fell into the €59m indicative programme
relating to the 2002-2006 CSP. Another programme is in the pipeline: the MOSEF on the
modernisation of the forestry sector. A NGO project (€1,14m Bosques y Agua) was added to the sample
in order to diversify aid modalities in the analysis.
31 The understanding of the evaluation criteria is based on the definitions of the OECD DAC Glossary 2002 for
effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency, and on the Joint Evaluation Unit’s definition guidelines for
Commission value added, relevance, coherence (in the sense of coherence with other development interventions by
the EC in the country), and the “3Cs” (coordination, complementarity, and coherence with other European
Community policies).
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EQ1 tackles the EC’s approach to natural resources at strategic level, assessing the relevance and coherence
of the Natural Resource Management (NRM) strategies applied by the EC-funded interventions, how these
have co-evolved along with the NRM approaches followed by Honduran public and non-public sector actors,
coordination with other donors, and the effect of EC interventions on public strategies. It also assesses the
relations between NRM, Food Security and Decentralisation.
EQ2 on Natural Resource Achievements addresses the EC interventions in terms of achievements, mainly
in terms of impact and sustainability. It analyses the extent to which the EC contributed to strengthening
the management of natural resources. It also assesses the evolution of the EC strategy towards a stronger
insistence on information and coordination between actors at different levels, central and local. The shift in
the EC implementation approach is also taken into account. Additionally, it also covers coherence with
other EC cooperation interventions.
The answers to the two questions have been merged because some topics pertain as much to the area of
strategic choices as to concrete achievements. Such are the cases of complementarities and coordination’s with
other donors’ cooperation, synergies between the EC’s own programmes linked to natural resources, and the
link between NRM, Food Security and decentralisation.
EQ 1 and EQ2 on Natural Resource Strategy and Achievements –
Answer Summary Box
In natural resources the EC approach was linked to the consequences of Hurricane Mitch
and was relevant in the Honduran context. It tried to address the causes of the natural
resource mismanagement problem (poverty, land tenure, legal and institutional settings)
and launched two major and complementary projects, PROCORREDOR working on
protected areas and biodiversity, and FORCUENCAS on watersheds and community
forestry. These will be soon followed by a third intervention: MOSEF.
These interventions had only a very partial impact on the complex realities of the
Honduran policy and the 2008 Forest Law was little influenced through EC policy
dialogue. Honduras has no real committed policy in this sector and no policy dialogue was
conducted on the causes of resources mismanagement or in support to a national agenda
on natural resources management.
The interventions analysed showed some positive features:
 There was a clear learning process from one intervention to the other, at least
concerning the bilateral projects and during the evaluation period.
 Actions and approaches were coordinated with and complementary to those of other
donors and coordination was sought with some other EC interventions.
 Capacities of local actors (mainly municipalities) have effectively increased in the areas
of the EC interventions.
 Some national institutions such as the Agenda Forestal Hondureña (AFH), the
Instituto de Conservación Forestal (ICF) and CONADEH received impressive
support from FORCUENCAS and PROCORREDOR.
However:
 No lessons were drawn from a successful and innovative project such as “Bosques y
Agua” (being too small and too far away).
 FORCUENCAS and PROCORREDOR being ongoing projects, many results and
impacts are still unknown because no final evaluation has yet been conducted.
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4.1.1 Response to the causes of the problem and to ongoing dynamics
(JC 1.1)
Environmental issues were put at the forefront of public attention following the impact of
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, when Honduran society awoke to the consequences of
widespread neglect of environmental assets, leading to attention on the need to reduce
socio-economic vulnerabilities. The Commission captured the problems in its
programming documents: both CSPs contain a robust analysis of environmental issues, the
role of Hurricane Mitch, the links with vulnerability and poverty, with land tenure, and with
legal and institutional questions. The EC thus places NRM in a wider context, considering
support to food security and strengthening of local capacities as essential elements of the
approach to environmental management (see Box 1 below and section 5 on food security).
In terms of specific environmental support, the EC’s answer to the problem it described in
the CSPs was to launch two major projects: PROCORREDOR working on protected areas
and biodiversity, and FORCUENCAS on watersheds and community forestry. The project
identification and formulation documents of these projects as well as the grant application
for the ‘Bosques y Agua’ project on the NGO budget line32 clearly identified the problems
to be solved and proposed appropriate responses. The interventions flexibly
complemented each other, focusing on significant NRM problems, and applying strategies
that are responsive to locally-specific causes of natural resource mismanagement and to the
dynamics of the drivers of improvements. On the whole, the programming of Commission
support to Natural Resource Management (NRM) thus responded to the identified causes
of the natural resource management problems.
Furthermore monitoring reports, project implementation reports, interviews and the
conclusions of the CSP 2007-2013 show that the programming and the interventions were
sufficiently flexible to take into account the on-going dynamics. The programmes have
maintained continued relevance as problem dynamics evolved, with PROCORREDOR
showing particular agility, due to the active communication channels the Project has
established via modern methods of citizen participation, support to research on relevant
NRM techniques and methods and associated actions for lesson-learning, piloting,
systematisation and sharing of information; social auditing, multi-agent networking;
capacity-development and by constantly fostering communication across stakeholders on
key issues.
4.1.2 Effect on ongoing public and private strategies (JC 1.2)
In the absence of clear Government strategies for NRM, the Commission’s dialogue was
mainly focused on specific issues tackled at project level rather than at global policy level.
Indeed, available information shows that no clear attribution can be established for the
policy incidence of EC interventions on the major framework legislation of the 2008 Forest
Law33. No clear statement of formal EC NRM policy dialogue objectives at Delegation
32 The « Bosques y Agua » project is only one of the many projects financed in this sector by the EC through non
programmable budget lines. Therefore the findings related to the Bosques y Agua project may not be extended to
others.
33 Although FORCUENCAS became a key field agent for implementing the Forest Law.
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level, for any recent period, is yet available. More than €60m was spent during the
evaluation period on NRM, but no national agenda has emerged which would indicate that
this question is taken seriously by national authorities. In particular there is a consensus on
the fact that the agricultural sector is a major driver of deforestation, but no policy exists to
try to control this dynamic.
However the Ministry for National Resources and Environment (SERNA) is using the
considerable improvements made by the Atlantida Region (PROCORREDOR) as a case
study of best practice for improving SERNA’s national role. There are also clear examples
of lower level policy dialogue and incidence achieved on the ground, through practical
demonstrations of good practice in NRM34.
PROCORREDOR has improved the approaches taken by NGOs in managing protected
areas, so that these take on board a wider and more socially-focussed approach; and all
three projects evaluated have influenced the policies of municipalities in NRM, especially
by supporting their role as decentralised bodies in watershed management.
4.1.3 Learning process in EC cooperation on NRM, coordination and
complementarities with other interventions and with other donors
(JC 1.3, 1.4, 2.4)
The main elements on this question are the following:
 There is a clear progression in methods and coordination from FORCUENCAS to
PROCORREDOR and these two interventions are in turn useful precursors to
MOSEF. PROCORREDOR has avoided most of FORCUENCAS initial
implementation difficulties, is better integrated into the Honduran public
administration and since its beginning has applied modern techniques of
communication, participation and information thus laying the grounds for improved
sustainability.
 However synergies with other interventions in natural resources, in food security or in
decentralisation were scarcely searched for. No lessons were learnt from the successful
and innovative “Agua y Bosque” project, but coordination was ensured between
FORCUENCAS and the EC regional PREVDA intervention. Synergies were not
deliberately sought, but were left to the initiative of each project (Annex 8, I-2.4.1 to I-
2.4.3). Although many results were obtained in strengthening local capacities, no links
were established with the PROADES budget support which initially supported the
application of a decentralisation policy.
 Actions and approaches were coordinated with and complementary to those of other
donors35 and are consistent with normal good development practice36. However no
34 For example an EC Brussels staff member came to Honduras to explain the FLEGT programme for control of illegal
logging to regional and national interested parties.
35 For example, FORCUENCAS mentions, amongst others, coordination with: GTZ in forest and biodiversity
management; with COSUDE on low-consumption cooking stoves and ovens; with ACDI Canada overall support of
the forestry sector; with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, on ecosystem management;
with GTZ’s PRORENA on their Natural Resources Programme and RIOPLUS systematisation; with SNV on
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evidence was found on a division of labour between the main actors in the field of
natural resource management37.
 It was not possible to establish the EC’s comparative advantage compared with other
bilateral MS aid agencies in the field of NRM38, but according to independent
observers, at country level, the agency with greatest experience in forestry is GTZ.
4.1.4 Effect on capacity of local actors and national institutions (JC 2.1,
JC 2.2)
The two projects have a large geographical and population coverage.
FORCUENCAS covers three watersheds and 5 departments amongst which Francisco
Morazán (Tegucigalpa). It aims at 450,000 beneficiaries. PROCORREDOR covers 19
municipalities with a total population of 1.8m inhabitants, mainly in the Atlantida
department. Increasing local capacities is the main objective of each project but none has
yet been evaluated in term of effectiveness, efficiency and impact, and no quantitative
results are yet available. However:
At the level of local actors, essentially municipalities, all sources (monitoring reports,
EARM, project reports, interviews...) argue that capacities have effectively increased in the
area of the EC interventions on natural resources.
strengthening local organisational capacities; with CIDA and the Canadian Partnership on natural resources and
forest management methods; with SIDA/Sweden on software support; and again with GTZ on actions in the Rio
Platano Biosphere Reserve. Other contacts included agencies such as USAID-MIRA, FAO, IDB and UNDP.
PROCORREDOR has coordinated a very large suite of actions with donors, such as on disaster risk management
with the World Bank’s PMDN programme; FAO on agricultural extension methods; with Danish NGO Nepenthes,
on eco-tourism; with Spanish cooperation’s Proyecto de Fortalecimiento Municipal, strengthening municipalities; with
the World Bank PATH Project, improving land registration processes; with PNUD, supplying small donations to
SMEs; with GTZ’s PRORENA, collaborating Proyecto USAID/MIRA PREMACA-DANIDA.
36 A PROCORREDOR staff member states: “Coordination has been highly effective with other projects, such as the World Bank
PMDN programme, where, to avoid duplication, work was distributed between the two project intervention areas. With some projects,
agreements or letters of understanding were signed”. See also Annex 8: I-1.4.2 to I-1.4.5.
37 As noted by a PROCORREDOR staff member: “The project serves as a facilitator, so was not responsible for
determining the division of labour between agencies, which has arisen organically through agreements between
development actors. The project approach was to facilitate capacity-building using participatory methods”.
38 However the 2009 Monitoring Report notes: “the coverage of FORCUENCAS actions in its area of intervention is particularly
important for synergies with other projects working in the same region. Because of the intense work carried out across the region focused on
increasing participation, FORCUENCAS is regarded as the leading reference for other actors in international
cooperation.”
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This increase in local capacities was related to interventions of the three selected projects in
the following domains:
 Watershed management (including water quality)39
 Cadastre, land titling and spatial planning (rendered easier with GPS technology). This,
in turn, had also an impact on conflict resolution and taxation. In turn increased land
taxes and taxation revenues for municipalities meant an increased capacity to finance
development. Success in spatial planning means that the fundamental issue of land
insecurity may be declining as a cause of failure in NRM efforts.
 Forest management and reforestation
 Municipal capacity which was directly favoured through support to Strategic Municipal
development Plans40 (PEDM), administrative capacity, accounting systems, equipment,
and lobbying capacity.
 Other themes cover for example: (1) hygiene and sanitation; (2) energy efficient stoves
and ovens; (3) education and environmental awareness; (4) solid and liquid waste
management; (5) sustainable farming practices; (6) social auditing; (7) wildfire
prevention and control; (8) soil management.
The strengthening of local capacities, especially municipalities, is an indirect support to
decentralisation policies because stronger capacities at this level is a condition to a
successful decentralisation (see Box 1).
An interesting innovation is the challenge for all agents to broker ‘deals’ in which
communities agree to protect key natural resources (forests, habitats, target species) in
return, for example, for help in making agriculture more sustainable, and wider support to
communities in reaching their development potentials. This was particularly the case with
the “Bosques and Agua” project and with PROCORREDOR.
However:
 In projects such as FORCUENCAS and PROCORREDOR with a large geographical
coverage, it is extremely difficult to attribute to a given intervention the observed
improvement in local actors’ capacity.
 In many cases the precise results and impacts of projects are not known because no
evaluation has yet been conducted. For example, impacts on deforestation and water
management are unclear for lack of evaluations (Annex 8, I-2.2.1). Both
FORCUENCAS and PROCORREDOR worked on land titling and planning, but no
39 An effect of improving watershed management is that local water user committees are now seen, within policy and
procedures, as having a vital role which cannot be ignored in the process of managing an area of land for the servicing
of water production. If these groups, within their communities, reach a stage where their role in management of the
land and water supply infrastructure is recognised - and their services are paid for - across watersheds, then one would
expect that project to be well on the way to sustainability (Annex 8 I-2.1.6).
40 However experience shows that considerable time is needed before real linkages develop, with local NRM deliberately
factored into local development plans rather than occurring as a by-product of local initiatives or available
opportunities (Annex 8, I-2.1.5).
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precise information is available on results. There are important exceptions to this, e.g.
on municipal finance41.
 Poor rural municipalities lack high quality human resources and the traditional change
of the entire administrative staff after each election implies that capacity building
efforts have to begin again from scratch after each election.
At the level of national institutions, different documents and EC staff members stress
that FORCUENCAS has supplied impressive support to national entities such as the
“Agenda Forestal Hondureña” (AFH) or the “Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos”
(CONADEH) from which depends the Independent Forest Monitor responsible for
receiving complains for illegal logging. FORCUENCAS stimulated the formation of a large
number of “Consejos Consultivos Forestales” (CCF).
According to high government officials, PROCORREDOR has significantly increased the
effectiveness of the “Instituto de Conservación Forestal” (ICF) and SERNA feels
strengthened in its role supporting the Caribbean Biological Corridor (CBC) within the
wider effort to overcome poverty.
However there is not enough ground to sustain that the interventions have significantly
increased the capacity of national institutions to intervene in sustainable management of
natural resources.
41 Significant changes achieved by PROCORREDOR in Municipal finances are: (i) Funds received are well managed
and properly invested; (ii) Capacity has greatly increased to generate municipal tax income (with increases of 45% in
the period Jan – Sept 2010 in relation with those received in 2009), and to invest this most effectively; (iii) All
investments follow best practice guidelines; (iv) Municipal authorities are improving their accounting systems and are
now able to respond to requests for information, so fulfilling the need for transparency (Annex 8 I-2.1.6).
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Box 1:Linking natural resource management, food security and decentralisation
International literature and Honduran experience show that on the question of NRM there
is a progressive shift from centralised towards decentralised management because decisions
on some common resources such as forest, water, soil or protected areas, require a quantity
of information that can only be efficiently gathered and treated at a decentralised level.
Therefore there is an evident link between NRM and decentralisation.
The same is true for a policy of food security aiming at improving food access (rather than
food availability) in rural areas: food security is improved through rural development which
in turn means policies improving employment, access to production factors, management
of natural resources, etc. In turn many aspects of these policies (such as land planning,
small productive initiatives, credit, etc.) are more efficiently executed at a decentralised
level. There is a practical link between food security and decentralisation. Land security
plays a special role in these policies for its importance both at individual level (land security
favours investment and should improve food availability as well as food access), and at
communal level through its effect on taxation and municipal revenues.
The link between NRM and food security is secured by the idea that if people improve
their livelihood (food security), they will be better prepared to take care of NRM because
they will give more importance to the long term. This is a fundamental principle of the EC
strategy on NRM.
In Honduras the EC has intervened in these three fields:
• Food security through a large number of interventions, the last of which, PASAH, is
analysed in this evaluation (see EQ3).
• Decentralisation through PROADES (EQ7)
• Natural Resource Management through many interventions, the most recent ones being
FORCUENCAS and PROCORREDOR (EQ1 and 2).
Therefore it is not surprising to find that interventions in the three fields share very similar
methods: supporting local (municipal) capacities in general development planning, land
planning (“ordenamiento territorial”) and titling, administration, accounting, control (social
auditing), and management of collective resources.
However, despite this comprehensive strategy there are few practical links between each of
these three fields. Synergies, complementarities and coordination are left to the initiative of
each intervention and are not organised in a top-down form.
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4.3 EQ 3 on Food Security
EQ3: To what extent has the EC contributed to strengthening conditions for food
security?
The purpose of the question is to assess the effectiveness of the EC interventions on food security. In addition it
considers the relevance of the EC approach in the national context, alignment with national policies and dynamics,
coherence with other EC cooperation interventions, coordination, harmonisation and synergies with other donors, EC
added-value, effects of the intervention at central and decentralised levels, integration of Gender and Decentralisation
as a cross-cutting issue, and sustainability of the approach.
The question on food security is based on the analysis of two very different interventions: first a small (€1m) project
implemented through FAO, executed by local NGOs and terminated in 2007, and second a sector budget support
(PASAH) financed by the food security budget line (€24m) and presently (February 2011) beginning a two year
phasing-out process.
EQ 3 on Food Security – Answer Summary Box
The EC strategy on food security has been adequate and relevant because (i) it built on a
long and diversified EC experience on FS in this country, (ii) it supported a policy which
stemmed from the application of the PRSP in 2001, continued in the same line but was
recently reinforced and can thus be considered as a State policy, (iii) it was based on an
intensive and fruitful policy dialogue which led to concrete results such as an
improvement of inter-institutional coordination, better information, more effective
strategy and policy instruments, a (future) improvement of the legal framework and an
improvement in budget allocation.
Through PASAH successes at a strategic level, the EC has certainly contributed to
strengthening conditions for food security and the prospects for the sustainability of
results obtained is good because they stem from the GoH’s own actions at the legislative
and executive levels.
At field level, both projects analysed obtained positive results (in particular they enhanced
the capacity of some municipalities to provide support to food security) even though these
remained limited because the late start of the intervention followed by the 2009
interruption reduced the time of implementation, and deep-rooted institutional capacity
constraints remain to be solved.
A phasing out of PASAH is presently on-going; no analysis is available on this sectors’
need for support and no more interventions are planned in a near future.
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4.3.1 Adequacy of approach given national dynamics (JC 3.1)
EC Food Strategy in Honduras has a very long history, moving from a band-aid
approach dominant in the 1970s with food aid, towards food security policies promoted
through budget support. Since the end of the 1990s, EC strategy has been based on the
observation that food insecurity is much more a problem of access to food than a problem
of food availability. Therefore it had to be tackled through poverty reduction approaches:
diversification of production, employment, transformation and marketing, organisation,
access to production factors such as land and credit, management of natural resources, etc.
It also became evident that food security policy had to be directly linked to
decentralisation, education and rural development policies.
The FAO seed project was a response to the need, urgently felt after Hurricane Mitch
(1998), for access to locally produced good quality seed and for production diversification.
PASAH had more general goals and implemented two main components: a strategic
component supporting the application of the national strategy of food security, and a field
component in 57 poor rural municipalities (out of 298) to (i) bring in municipal planning
regulations oriented towards the sustainable management of natural resources, and (ii) to
strengthen the planning of local economic development with the support of local initiatives
on food security.
This EC approach to food security has been relevant and adequate for the following
reasons:
 EC strategy was aligned to a national strategy which was first marked by the adoption
of the National Strategy for Implementation of the Food Security Policy (SFSP) in
October 2006. In turn this document was updated in November 2010 and was named
the National Strategy on Food and Nutrition Security (ENSAN). Therefore PASAH is
supporting a food security policy which has remained constant despite four different
governments and has thus been converted into a State policy.
 The strategic component of PASAH is based on an intensive and fruitful policy
dialogue which led to concrete results such as an improvement of inter-institutional
coordination, better information and more effective policy instruments (see also 4.3.3
and 4.7).
 The field component of PASAH increased GoH participation and experience in
municipal planning and support to food security.
 The EC showed a high degree of flexibility and adaptability when maintaining the
international technical assistance despite the interruption of cooperation between the
EU and Honduras following the 2009 events. In these circumstances, the Delegation in
Honduras and the ITA team maintained the interest on FS and took advantage of this
relative inactive period of over 12 months to prepare reports on FS in Honduras and
on the EC’s experience in this field. These works were used in the following year for
the elaboration of the ESAN.
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4.3.2 Synergies and coordination with other cooperation programmes (JC
3.2, 3.3)
Since 1998, more than 12 projects or programmes, directly or indirectly linked to food
security and financed by the EC, were implemented in Honduras. They were executed at
national or regional levels and stemmed from different budget lines (see annex 8, J.C 3.2).
Given the number of past and present interventions linked to FS, the preparatory
documents of PASAH insisted on the necessity of synergies and cooperation between
some of these interventions and with programmes from other donors.
Although being a budget support intervention thus supporting the policies, priorities and
procedures of national authorities, PASAH also sought to establish opportunities for
complementarities and coordination. For example, the geographical coverage of the field
component of PASAH was the same as the programme “Tierra” in order to ensure
continuity between these two interventions. Strategic alliances were sought with other EC
programmes such as PRESANCA or FORCUENCAS but did not lead to joint action.
Likewise, direct relations were planned with PROADES (through PRODDEL and the
SGJ) since decentralisation is an important aspect of the strategy of food security
supported by PASAH, but the limited success of PROADES hindered this attempt.
Instead, the route followed by PASAH was somewhat different: it supported the
institutionalisation of a permanent dialogue between the GoH, civil society and
international donors through its support for the creation of the “Comité Técnico
Interinstitucional de Seguridad Alimentaria” (COTISAN) which brings together 42
different institutions. COTISAN established a map of matching institutions in order to see
where help on FS is concentrated, to facilitate cooperation and avoid overlaps.
The substantial experience of the EC on food security, the diversity of approaches
followed, the evolution of these approaches based on regular evaluations of these
interventions, all contribute to a real expertise of the EC in this field and to a
comparative advantage of EC cooperation over other donors.
4.3.3 Management of food security at central level (JC 3.4)
At central level institutional management of food security has improved significantly and is
linked to the implementation of PASAH mainly – but not exclusively42 – through the policy
dialogue held by the international technical assistance team which worked on all (but the
first) elements cited below. These main elements which sustain this assessment are the
following:
 In 2007, after the disbursement of the first fixed tranche of PASAH (€2m), the GoH
decided to devote €1m of its own resources to the Food Security strategy.
 In 2008, COTISAN was created (see 4.3.2).
42 According to different interviewees, the conditions attached to disbursements also constituted useful
incentives.
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 In 2010, the GoH created a technical coordination for Food Security, between all the
public institutions with a responsibility on this matter, thus reducing the jurisdictional
disputes between them.
 A new system of information and indicators was designed in order for the UTSAN
(Unidad Técnica de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional) to assess and monitor the Food and
Nutritional Security National Strategy (ENSAN).
 The Secretary of the Presidency (SP) established a strategic alliance with Parliament in
order to prepare the new law on food and nutritional security and protect its budget.
 A realistic and simple technical proposal was drafted by UTSAN so that a future
conditional cash transfer system will benefit the poorest in Honduras, avoiding political
pressures and clientelism.
 PASAH supported the Secretary of the Presidency in its negotiation with the Secretary
of Finance (SEFIN) and obtained, in 201043, a direct budget increase for the public
institutions involved in Food Security.
4.3.4 At local level: municipalities’ capacity for support to food security
(JC 3.5)
Activities geared towards planning regulations for sustainable management of natural
resources were conducted in 44 municipalities. PASAH also helped finance 118 small
productive projects (local initiatives on food security) benefiting 397 women and included
in the Municipal Development Plans.
Activities such as cadastre and land titling have important impacts on municipal finance
through taxation and therefore are easily supported by the local councils. Also some
institutional innovations at municipal level are worth mentioning such as the setting-up of a
women’s municipal bureau (“Oficina Municipal de la Mujer”) and the use of social audits
(often conducted by women) which allows for the participation of civil society in the
control of local governments.
Certainly the field component of PASAH has enhanced the capacity of some municipalities
(less than 20% of Honduran municipalities) to provide support to food security and to
apply more effectively a decentralisation policy, but these results were limited for four main
reasons:
 Time was very short (implementation really started in 2008)
 The consequences of the 2009 crisis lasted more than one year during which the
fieldwork was interrupted. This work started again in August 2010.
 In poor rural municipalities, there is a lack of human resources capable of reading and
using spatial planning instruments such as maps
 This component is managed by two public institutions (SAG and INA) which suffer
from limitations in staff, transport and methodology44.
43 In 2007 and 2008, the SG had obtained FROM SEFIN a special budget for food security and signed an agreement
with each of the public institutions concerned by FS so as to spend this budget.
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4.3.5 Sustainability of approach and actions, and its impact on women
(JC 3.6, 3.7)
At strategic level the existence of a law on FS is probably the most important indicator of
ownership of the policy supported by the EC, even if it does not guarantee its
effectiveness. This law establishes food security as a national priority in term of policy goals
and budget, and therefore ensures (to some extent) the financial sustainability of the FS
policy supported by PASAH45. The creation of the UTSAN, of COTISAN and the
diffusion of information and instruments of analysis linked to FS strategies are also
indicators that the PASAH approach will probably continue in the future after the end of
the intervention.
Although the phasing-out of PASAH is very important for the consolidation of the
programme, no analysis is yet available on this sector’s need for support and no more FS
programmes are planned in the near future (nor at a regional level). This may result in
future in the loss of the EC’s experience in food security, its main field of value added in
Honduras.
At the local or field level, the strengthening of municipal capacities in spatial planning and
food security is hindered by the non-existence of a more or less stable local administration,
given the overall change of the entire administrative staff after each election. Small local
initiatives directed towards women have sustainability problems linked to their design46, to
the poverty of the economic environment and to the difficulty of training and monitoring.
The FAO project also suffered from the difficulty in organising, in only a few years,
sustainable small seed enterprises in a very poor economic and low educational level
environment.
As for the gender approach, PASAH incorporated a gender indicator as a condition for
its variable tranche disbursement47, and two other gender indicators are part of the ENSA
monitoring system48. Most small local productive projects benefit women’s groups.
However, availability, access and use of food have not structurally changed for women.
PASAH had no ambition to change availability of food for women because it was detected
that the problem was more about food access (poverty) than availability. The programme
further focused on employment and new sources of income for women. It did not directly
address the problem of food use. As mentioned above, it had a reduced effect on food
access because of the limited scope and success of the small local initiatives.
44 The budget support has helped these institutions but it is not possible to expect a significant improvement after only
a few months.
45 It was not possible to compare the budget increase in FS institutions during 2010, with the 2011 budget approved by
Parliament in November 2010. Therefore it was not feasible to assess strictly the continuity of the quantitative
changes in the FS financing in Honduras. Additionally the real expenses are normally between 20 and 30% higher
than the corresponding budget prepared the year before its execution (see annex 8 I-7.1.2).
46 Most small projects visited by the evaluation mission consisted of giving resources (money, material and training) to
groups of women with very little counterpart, except for promises of duplication which are not kept.
47 At least 400 women benefit from the small productive initiatives promoted by PASAH.
48 Gender considerations are incorporated in local development plans, and women’s offices (Oficinas Municipales de la
Mujer) are established in municipalities, which play an important role in monitoring local initiatives and in the
implementation of the development plans.
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4.4 EQ 4 on Education
EQ4: To what extent has secondary education been strengthened and has the EC
contributed to it?
Education is considered as part of the EC focal sectors in both the 2002-2006 and the 2007-2013 CSPs. In the
latter CSP it is actually considered as global support to the national Poverty Reduction Strategy. This evaluation
question treats the overall EC approach to education, while focussing in terms of impact on secondary education, for
three main reasons. Firstly, because the 2002-2006 CSP prescribed focus on secondary education (‘as the WB had
already put emphasis on primary education’). Secondly, EC action corresponding to the 2002-2006 CSP’s education
focal sector consisted of support to secondary education, through the €28m PRAEMHO programme. Third ly, EC
support to education in the 2007-2013 CSP consisted of global budget support to the national PRS (through the
€61m APERP programme for which no disbursements had been made until November 2010), rather than of a
specific EC strategy or approach in education. The question will also cover vocational training as part of secondary
education. The EC considers the two to be closely linked when it states in its strategy for 2007-2013: “[T]he
development of secondary/vocational education will also make it possible to address the issue of massive youth
unemployment.”
Firstly there is comprehensive questioning at sector level in the sense that the question considers the relevance of the
EC approach in the national context, alignment with national policies and dynamics, coherence with then prevailing
EC cooperation policies, division of labour, coordination, harmonisation and synergies with other donors (with a focus
on EU MS), EC added-value. Subsequently, the question assesses more specifically improvement in secondary
education, notably in terms of access and quality, and the extent to which the EC contributed to such improvement.
Finally, it studies the integration of the cross-cutting issue of Gender, and the sustainability of the approach.
EQ 4 on Education – Answer Summary Box
The EC’s support to education evolved from a focus on vocational training through the
PRAEMHO project in the beginning of the evaluation period to a more general support
to the education sector as a whole via the general budget support operation APERP at the
end of the period. At the same time, a limited contribution to the basket fund aiming for
Education For All (EFA) was also implemented in the mid 2000s. These different
supports were aligned with the priorities and expressed needs of the Ministry of
Education.
The emphasis on vocational training provided an efficient way of developing the
productive sector of the country badly in need of a better skilled workforce. The
approach, focused on poverty reduction, was in total coherence with the EU Consensus
on Development. Furthermore, the contribution to the EFA programme at the primary
education level was also coherent and complementary to the activities of PRAEHMO in
vocational training which are perceived as giving a follow-up to EFA.
EC support through PRAEMHO achieved interesting results in the field of vocational
training that are likely to be capitalised upon by the Government and other donors in
which case sustainability would be ensured. The EC itself has opted to support the
education sector overall through the APERP (general budget support) rather than
renewing its direct support through another project in vocational training.
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4.4.1 The EC approach in education and national dynamics (JC 4.1)
Over the evaluation period the Commission supported education through three main
projects/programmes: the PRAEMHO project (€28m decided in 2003) which mainly
focused on vocational training, support to the Education For All programme (€2m
contribution to the EFA basket fund decided in 2006) and the general budget support
programme APERP (€61m decided in 2008) with special attention devoted to health and
education.
Following Hurricane Mitch and in the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS),
the GoH has expressed its commitment to closely link its development strategy with
support to health and education. Furthermore, the government perceived the strengthening
of vocational training as an efficient tool in reducing poverty in the sense that this
specialised sector of secondary education is attended mainly by adolescents from low-
income families.49 The Ministry of Education also wished to strengthen vocational training
as a key to developing the productive sector of the country badly in need of a better skilled
workforce.
The EC shared this analysis and established the same linkages between education, poverty
reduction and development. It also stressed the importance of vocational training in its
approach and stated in its CSP 2002-2006: “The education system is in need of complete overhaul to
adapt it to the market conditions and requirements; nowadays some 85% of the curricula concern
traditional (often theoretic) matters and only 15% are linked to the productive sector.” 50 Such necessity
had also been emphasised in the 2004 evaluation of EC cooperation with Honduras which
described the problem of unemployment and the fact that the education system was not
addressing the needs of the country.51
The EC was very much aligned with the priorities of the GoH and responded specifically
to the needs of the Ministry of Education in the field of vocational training when it
designed the project PRAEMHO. The three objectives of PRAEMHO may be
summarised as follows:
 To establish the Legal Framework for professional education, to guarantee the
qualifications for competitiveness.
 To improve the quality of the Professional Education Centres by organizing a reference
network, equipped and managed by qualified teachers.
 To benefit students from the most vulnerable groups by giving them access to training
through financial aid and insertion into the workforce.
49 IBF International Consulting, Evaluación Final del Programa de Apoyo a la Enseñanza Media en Honduras (PRAEMHO):
Borrador Informe Final, Junio de 2008, p. 12.
50 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Honduras: 2002-2006, p.15.
51 MWH-ODI-ECDPM, Evaluation de la stratégie de coopération de la Commission Européenne avec le Honduras, Vol. 1 : Rapport
de Synthèse, 2004, p.50.
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According to an EC staff member, PRAEMHO was initially to be implemented through
sectoral budget support. This decision was revised and the project approach was adopted
mainly because Honduras did not have a sector policy in the field of education.
4.4.2 Coherence of the EC approach with then prevailing overall EC
cooperation policies, notably in the field of education (JC 4.2)
One of the common principles of the “European Consensus on Development” is that “The
EU will support partner countries' poverty reduction, development and reform strategies, which focus on the
MDGs […]”.52 Even though the “Consensus” was only published in 2006 this had already
been a practice of the EC at the beginning of the millennium. It is therefore in total
coherence with this development policy that the EC chose education as a focal sector in
both CSPs.
For the period 2002-2006, the EC approach to education was framed therefore within the
PRS which had as one of its six areas of intervention: “[I]nvestment in human resources through
the improvement of access to and the increase in the quality of basic services of health and education.”53
In the mid-2000s, it became clear that the “human capital” pillar (health and education) had
become “the pillar in which the largest financing gap had been identified, jeopardising the achievement of
the related PRSP/MDG goals.”54 The EC chose therefore as a focal sector “Human and social
development – Making the PRSP a catalyst for social cohesion” with equal importance given to
health and education.
At the implementation level, the EC’s decision to support the Education for All
Programme (EFA) in 2006 was also coherent with respect to the activities previously
foreseen by the PRAEMHO programme. The DTAs of PRAEMHO state in this respect
that the work done by the programme in vocational training will offer a follow-up for some
of the activities of the EFA at the primary level as it shall “in time help to face the challenge
introduced by the EFA programme which seeks to universalise 6th grade education.”55
The involvement of the EC in education thus evolved from a strong focus on vocational
education with the PRAEMHO, to a more general support through budget support and a
much more financially limited contribution to a basket fund for primary education. It is
noted that despite PRAEMHO’s significant results achieved in vocational training (see
below) and the GoH’s wish to continue the project with a second phase, the EC did not
follow suit. Instead it provided general budget support through the APERP (Apoyo
Presupuestario a la Estrategia de Reducción de Probreza) oriented towards education and health
but without specific focus on secondary/vocational education (through the monitoring of
performance indicators for example).
52 European Parliament, Council and European Commission, The European Consensus on Development, 2006/C46, p. 3.
53 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Honduras: 2002-2006, p. 8.
54 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Honduras: 2007-2013, p.22.
55 Convenio de Financiación entre la Comunidad Europea y la Republica de Honduras ALA/2003/5747.
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4.4.3 Coordination of EC approach in education with and complementary
to other donors’ cooperation (JC 4.3)
In its 2002-2006 CSP, the EC justifies the focus on secondary/vocational education by
putting forward complementarity with other donors’ cooperation: “[E]ducation has not
received adequate attention from donors and among those active and in particular the World Bank the
emphasis is put on quality standards and primary education. Therefore, it is proposed that this programme
concentrates on secondary education[…]”56
This complementarity is not surprising as there is a good coordination of donors in the
sector of education. There are two instances where donors can exchange on education: i)
the EFA Pool Fund Donors Group; and ii) the G-16 Round Table (Mesa Redonda de
Cooperantes Externos en Educación-MERECE) established in 1998.
 EFA is a common basket fund programme and the EFA group meets every two weeks
to monitor implementation, to approve disbursements, and to have one voice when
asking for changes or addressing national authorities.
 MERECE is a broader instance, where all agents involved in education meet every two
months. There are thirteen permanent members: CIDA (Canada), AECID (Spain),
EU, IDB, World Bank, GTZ, KfW, JICA (Japan), OEI57, World Food
Programme, UNICEF, UNFPA, USAID. The focus is on technical issues.
 The G16 has three internal levels: the group of ambassadors (GER) that focus on
political issues; the groups of technical experts (GTS) and finally the different thematic
round tables. The thirteen donors of MERECE constitute the G16 table on education.
The EC has been responsible for the coordination of the EFA fund group lately and has
used this mandate to increase synergies among different projects. According to a
representative from the Canadian cooperation (CIDA), donors that were MERECE
members but not involved in the EFA fund group could develop complementary actions
to the EFA initiative such as providing textbooks in the case of USAID and JICA, or
school meals in the case of the World Food Programme “thanks to the coordinating leadership
role played by the EC.”
4.4.4 Quality of secondary education (JC 4.4)
The effect of EC support on the quality of secondary education as a whole cannot be
established since the major EC intervention in this sector, PRAEMHO, focused only on
vocational training. As stated above, one of the three objectives of PRAEMHO addressed
the issue of increasing quality, namely: “To improve the quality of the Professional Education
Centres by organising a reference network, equipped and managed by qualified teachers.” In this area,
results were as follows:
56 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Honduras: 2002-2006, p.26.
57 Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura
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 Curriculum: This is probably one of the most important achievements of the
programme. The curricula developed by PRAEMHO were adopted as the national
curricula for vocational education. A representative of the Spanish cooperation
comments in this respect: “PRAEMHO has laid the groundwork for the development of
secondary education curricula oriented towards the job market. These are very good lessons learned and
provide a basis for future interventions in secondary education than other donors might want to do.”
 Training of teachers and administrative staff: The project was to train initially 1500
teachers in vocational education and 64 administrators. The targets were exceeded as a
total of 3171 teachers and 141 administrators were trained in high profile institutions
such as the Universidad José Cecilio del Valle and the Instituto Centroamericano de
Administración y Gestión de Empresas. According to an end-of-programme evaluation this
training had a real impact on how teachers perceived their pedagogical mission.58
 Benefiting students from the most vulnerable groups: Two initiatives were undertaken
to this end. The first one was the offer of scholarships. The evaluation informs in this
respect: “The scholarships have allowed a significant group (un grupo considerable) of students from
socially vulnerable sectors to complete their studies.”59 The second initiative consisted of
supporting students who graduated from vocational centres to create their small
enterprises. The evaluation considered this activity to be innovative and interesting but
its results were mixed due to a lack of coordination between the stakeholders and a lack
of clear perspective. At the time of the evaluation approximately 70% of the 360 small
enterprises created were still active and this number was expected to decrease if the
enterprises created in 2008 did not receive proper monitoring after the end of the
programme.
 Infrastructure and equipment: Only 17 of the 19 professional education centres were
built. Even then, there is a centre in almost each one of the 18 departments thus
providing good geographical coverage. The most critical problems occurred with the
equipment of the centres as only 28% of the investment in laboratories and other
equipment was actually being used by the teachers and students (39% of the equipment
was set-up but does not function and 33% is still to be installed)60.
PRAEMHO was not intended to have any impact on school attendance.
58 IBF International Consulting, Evaluación Final del Programa: Borrador Informe Final, Junio de 2008, p. 30.
59 Ibid.
60 Idem, p. 28. Some reasons that affected the use of the equipment are: i) Lack of appointment by the Ministry of
Education of the teachers in charge of the facilities built and equipped by PRAEMHO; ii) Lack of training on the
operation of equipment by the technical staff of the companies responsible for the workshops and provision of the
equipment to the laboratories; iii) Lack of software.
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4.4.5 Sustainability of EC approach and actions in secondary education
(JC 4.6)
The end-of-programme evaluation states that the project has a low sustainability as a
whole.61 The maintenance of infrastructure and equipment will depend on whether a
strategy is developed to this end at the local level62 as the project design did not fully
develop the question of sustainability and the EC has not foreseen continuing direct
support to the sector (other than through the general budget support). The component of
scholarships obtained good results but this activity ended with the conclusion of the
programme. The designing of curricula seems to be the component most promising in
terms of sustainability due to the appropriation on the part of the government described
above.
Indeed, despite this rating of low sustainability, the Ministry of Education has an interest to
continue with many activities started with PRAEMHO such as:
 To advance towards a new law of education
 To elaborate new plans for professional training
 To continue the training of teachers
 To develop maintenance plans for the infrastructure
In addition, other donors might support the Government in this endeavour such as the
German cooperation who stated: “PRAEMHO is a reference and we are studying it in order to
design our intervention.” It thus seems that the project has laid the grounds for the
Government and/or other donors to build and capitalise upon the initiatives started under
the project.
4.4.6 Gender equality and secondary education (JC 4.7)
The question of gender equality in secondary education is not problematic in Honduras in
the sense that, since the nineties, the enrolment of girls at all levels of education has been
greater than that of boys (see table below). Even then, gender was taken into account in the
design of PRAEMHO and the project generated good results. For example; among the
approximately 360 small enterprises created, 56.2% are administrated by women.63
Honduras has other challenges to face in terms of education such as the low coverage:
40.2% in 2009 (gross coverage) according to the Ministry of Education.
61 Idem, p.33.
62 However, according to PEFA there is no financial follow-up (provisions) for maintenance of public capital goods.
See 4.7.3
63 Idem, p.35.
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Table 8: Enrolment, Gross Coverage, and Net Coverage for
Secondary School Education (2006-2009)
Data 2006 2007 2008 2009F M T F M T F M T F M T
Enrolment 216,431 185,696 402,127 225,413 188,001 413,414 220,371 185,163 405,534 237,510 198,310 435,820
Gross
Coverage*
(%) 43.1 36.5 39.8 43.8 36.1 39.9 41.8 34.7 38.2 44.1 36.3 40.2
Net
Coverage**
( %) 18.6 16.1 17.3 18.3 15.2 16.7 18.6 15.6 17.1 19.9 16.3 18.1
Source: Datos del Departamento de Estadísticas del Ministerio de Educación, Diciembre 2010.
* Gross Coverage is the total number of students enrolled over the total number of students that should be enrolled.
** Net Coverage is the total number of students enrolled in the right age over the total number of students that should be enrolled
4.5 EQ 5 on Public Security
EQ5: To what extent has the EC approach in public security been relevant in the
national context and ongoing dynamics?
Justice and public security are a focal sector for EC bilateral cooperation in the 2007-2013 CSP (not in the previous
CSP), reflecting a problem which has become particularly acute over the last years. The EC has planned direct
support in this field with the commitment of €9m in 2007 to the PASS (Programa de Apoyo al Sector Seguridad en
Honduras). The PASS is to support the reform of the security sector through the backing of the National Security
Policy and the strengthening of the main institutions of the security and justice sectors in charge and responsible for
providing such services to the Honduran population, i.e. the Ministry of Security, the Public Ministry and the
Supreme Court. However, only the technical assistance has been contracted so far64 and hence nothing has been
implemented on the ground.
Assessment of concrete EC results or impact in this field is hence not possible. Nevertheless, an interesting ex ante
question remains as to what extent the EC strategy and approach to public security was relevant in the national
context and ongoing dynamics.65 This includes aspects of dialogue with the Government and with civil society. It also
encompasses consideration of the underlying reference documents or practices on which the EC strategy and approach
were based. The coherence with other EC public security programmes in Central America has further been assessed,
and the use of transferable lessons and searches of synergies with these other programmes. The question has
additionally verified the EC added-value in this field and the division of labour and coordination with other donors
(with a focus on EU MS), and the integration of the cross-cutting issue of Gender.
64 TA of €86,704 for launching the programme (“Asistencia Técnica de arranque al programa PASS”)
65 The evaluation team used the term “ongoing dynamics” to refer to the events occurring during the entire 2002-2009
evaluation period.
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EQ 5 on Public Security – Answer Summary Box
The EC addressed the highly relevant issue of rising insecurity in Honduras directly by
designing, under the CS P2008-2012, an institutional reform programme (the PASS)
targeting mainly the Ministry of Security but also the Public Ministry and the Supreme
Court. In the programme, the EC took into consideration international good practices
such as the recommendations of the OECD-DAC on Security System Reform (SSR).
There are indications that it wished with this sectoral and three-pronged approach –
prevention, law enforcement and rehabilitation- to tackle the root causes of the problem.
Initially, even though the GoH was concerned with the problem of insecurity, it had not
foreseen a sectoral reform programme. The EC had to engage in an intense policy
dialogue which was interrupted by the political crisis in 2009. The EC has recently
convinced the beneficiary institutions of the necessity to adopt a security and justice sector
approach. This approach can globally be considered as relevant, but in the delicate security
context of Honduras, the EC did not actively involve civil society from the start (which
was also an OECD-DAC recommendation). Subsequently, some members of civil society
failed to perceive the PASS as a reform programme and saw it rather as a programme to
strengthen institutions that had an active role in the 2009 events; the EC has tried to
address these concerns notably by establishing a dialogue with NGOs and human rights
defenders.
Before considering the judgement criteria, it is worth first explaining the causes for the
suspension of the PASS programme; and second describing the circumstances in which it is
being resumed.
The EC Delegation in Honduras informed with respect to the non-implementation of the
PASS in January 2010: “Under AIDCO Objectives 2 & 3 (and Priority 3 of the CSP) the PASS
programme was halted due to the political crisis and the aggravation of the human rights situation in the
country.” 66 The EC suspended its entire cooperation immediately after the beginning of the
2009 political crisis and re-established it in March 2010, several weeks after the takeover of
Porfirio Lobo as the newly elected president of Honduras (for details on the political
background, see section 2.1.1). Today, there are still tensions in the aftermath of the 2009
political crisis. To this complex political situation, a deterioration of human rights records
must be added.67 Furthermore, the PASS was conceived as a reform and an institutional-
building programme, which direct beneficiaries were the institutions of the Justice and
Security sector (Supreme Court, the Public Ministry -Fiscalía- and the Ministry of Security),
i.e. institutions that had an active role in the political events of 2009.
66 EC Delegation in Honduras, External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), 22 Jan 2010, p.2
67 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the violations of human rights in Honduras since the coup d’état
on 28 June 2009, March 2010.
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4.5.1 Causes of the problems and EC approach to public security (JC 5.1)
Under its CSP 2007-2013, the EC addressed the problem of rising insecurity in Honduras
notably by designing a reform programme (the PASS) targeting the Ministry of Security but
also the Public Ministry and the Supreme Court. Addressing public insecurity was highly
relevant when considering that Honduras has one of the highest levels of crime and
violence in the world. 68 In addition, crime and violence cost Central America around 8% of
its GDP, according to a 2011 World Bank report. In Honduras, cutting the murder rate by
10% would boost income growth per capita by up to 1% a year.69
A UNDP country evaluation informed in 2006 that crime, violence and insecurity were
related to rising drug trafficking and to the phenomenon of violent crime and gangs such as
the maras. It states that: “Social insecurity and drug trafficking are one manifestation of the
incompetence of the Ministry of Security, the police, Office of the Prosecutor and the Ministry of Justice.”70
As mentioned above, the PASS aims precisely at reforming the Ministry of Security, in
charge of managing the police, and the Public Ministry.
With the PASS the EC targeted the key institutions of the security and justice sector and
adopted a three-pronged approach simultaneously addressing prevention, law enforcement
and rehabilitation with a view to address the root causes of public insecurity. The need to
adopt such a global approach is described in the CSP 2007-2013. In practice, out of the 10
expected results of the PASS programme, 4 are directly related to prevention and
rehabilitation:
 drafting of prevention policies;
 implementation of rehabilitation policies ;
 reduction of the penitentiary population; and
 improvement of the living conditions in jails.
Whether this global approach will actually be able to effectively address the challenges
posed by insecurity in the country is another question difficult to answer as the only EC
programme in the public security sector has yet not been implemented.
Even though there is no mention of internationally-recognised good practices in the CSP,
some were factored in the designing of the PASS, and the programme description (DTAs)
makes a clear reference to the OECD-DAC Guidelines for Security Sector Reform (SSR).71
It is important to note that the adoption of one of these good practices namely Co-
responsibility and Inter-institutional Coordination was problematic in the PASS programme and
68 The UNDP provides as preliminary estimation for 2010 a rate of 72 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest in
the region and one of the highest in the world. In 2004 this rate was 46 murders/100,000 inhabitants. This rate would
have increased 72% in 6 years.
69 Crime and Violence in Central America – A Development Challenge, World Bank, report 56781, 1-09-2010.
70 UNDP, Country evaluation: The Assessment of Development Results – Honduras, 2006, p. 36.
71 For a more detailed description of these good practices see I-5.1.3 in Annex 8.
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may even have been a reason for delaying its implemention72 as strong confrontations
among the beneficiary institutions (Supreme Court and the Executive) emerged as early as
2008 when the programme was signed and worsened over time, finally contributing to the
political turmoil of mid-2009.
4.5.2 Policy dialogue conducted by the EC on public security in the
country (JC 5.2)
There was an ongoing effort on the part of the previous GoH to design a National Security
Plan. Since 2005, there has been a will on the part of the Honduran authorities to move
away from a law-and-order policy towards a more comprehensive approach.73 Yet, this
global approach to the problem of insecurity is not reflected in the functioning of the
relevant institutions. The policy dialogue of the EC actually focused on this necessity to
adopt a sectoral approach and on the related need for the relevant institutions of the
security and justice sector to coordinate themselves. Initially, the government did not want
a sector wide reform programme; the Supreme Court, the Public Ministry and the Ministry
of Security preferred to have three distinct projects. The negotiations with the GoH were
initiated in 2007, over a year before the signing of the financial agreement. They were
interrupted during the 2009 political crisis, and were taken up again after the takeover of
the Lobo administration in 2010. The “perfect political timing” referred to in the Annual
Action Plan 2007 was obsolete due to the change of government. Nevertheless, the new
government has begun working on the design of a National Security Policy and the
Minister of Security has committed himself to finalise and make public such a policy by
May 2011. The UNDP is supporting the drafting of this security policy and considers this
deadline realistic. Furthermore, the three beneficiary institutions of the PASS have recently
began to coordinate themselves and have agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding
between them.74 This achievement may be attributed to a great extent to the policy dialogue
conducted by the EC. Indeed, these two actions were directly suggested by the EC to the
beneficiary institutions as crucial conditions for the implementation of the PASS.75
However, there has been limited involvement of the civil society in the dialogue on security
issues whereas this is recommended by OECD-DAC with respect to Security Sector
Reform. EC support to civil society efforts to create a pro-reform environment was not
factored into the PASS’s design. The EC’s position was very difficult as heavy criticisms of
the PASS programme were formulated by civil society organisations in Honduras and
72 An article recently published by the Security Cluster of Initiative for Peacebuilding, gives a similar analysis emphasizing
that the PASS was properly designed, that it targeted the right institutions adopting the relevant global approach; but,
at the same time, the author underlines the specific problem of poor inter-institutional coordination and the more
global challenge of very weak ownership. Julia Schünemann, Initiative for Peacebuilding: “¿Una reforma sin apropiación?:
Dilemas en el apoyo a la reforma del sector seguridad y justicia en Honduras.
73 “Diagnostico de los Servicios de Prevención, Rehabilitación y Reinserción social de Personas vinculadas a
Pandillas o Maras in Honduras”, Programa Nacional de Prevención, Rehabilitación Y Reinserción Social, Unidad
desconcentrada de la Presidencia de la Republica de Honduras, Septiembre 2005.
74 Letter addressed to the Chargé d’Affaires of the European Delegation by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice
on December 17th 2010.
75 This achievement, however, does not mean that the institutions now own the programme.  On this question of lack
of ownership see Julia Schünemann, ¿Una reforma sin apropriación?, December 2010.
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abroad which were distrustful of the beneficiary institutions. The EC has reacted to these
criticisms both at the level of HQ and in the Delegation notably through answering of
letters and by trying to establish a dialogue with NGOs and human rights defenders
explaining its reform strategy. It reassured them on the fact that no funds have been
provided to those institutions but it could not convince several of them of the relevance of
its approach to reforming these institutions.
4.5.3 Coordination with and complementary to other donors’ cooperation
in public security (JC 5.3)
Until recently, the budgets allocated by the international community to programmes of
Public Security and/or Justice were very small and it was therefore easy to avoid overlaps
or any other problems linked to a lack of coordination in this field. It is interesting to note
that, for the same reason, there was no coordination effort on the part of the Government
either. Taking into consideration the significant budget of the EC’s PASS programme, a
“Donors Group in the Sector of Security and Justice” was revitalised. This group was to act
within the Stockholm Declaration framework which describes the mandate of the G-16
Groups of Donors in Honduras.76
The group, coordinated by the EC in 2009 and 2010, provides a forum for constructive
exchange of information and knowledge of “who does what” but has not yet given rise to
harmonisation of supports. Since 2009 coordination and harmonisation have been more
difficult as the participating donors have taken different positions on their support to the
sector: some have backed out of justice altogether (Spain) and some have widened the
scope of their involvement (IDB from justice to justice and security). The EC’s PASS
programme has been usefully complemented by work undertaken by the UNDP in the
formulation of a National Security Policy.
4.5.4 Transfer of lessons and optimised synergies with other EC public
security programmes in Central America (JC 5.4)
In its Country Strategy Paper, the EC emphasises that two of the three priorities –natural
resources and public security- address issues that are also regional concerns and “are thus
liable to promote Honduras’s regional integration agenda.”77 There is certain coherence in
the strategy documents in the sense that “Regional Governance and Security Matters” is a
focal sector in the RSP 2007-2013. Nevertheless, at intervention level, the different EC
documents on the PASS do not refer to any other intervention in the rest of Central
America may it be in Public Security or related fields of security and/or justice. There are
references to transferable lessons (general and operational) in the DTAs of the PASS but
they are non-programme specific. This apparent lack of coherence at the programming
level may be explained, however, by the fact that most of the funding for the two relevant
focal sectors at the regional level, namely “Regional Governance and Security Matters” and
76 After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the international community set up a joint coordination structure to maximise the
impact of the aid channeled to Central America. Concretely, in Honduras, an operational and well-structured group of
16 donors, the so-called G-16, was created.
77 Country Strategy Paper Honduras 2007-2013, p. 22
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“Consolidating the customs union and related harmonised and common policies” are
foreseen under the second Regional Indicative Programme for the years 2011-2013.
4.5.5 Gender dimension and EC approach to public security (JC 5.5)
This cross-cutting issue is mentioned in the CSP 2007-2013 and the PASS documents. The
CSP has an entire annex on gender profile (Annex IV). It further states that “the gender
dimension has also been integrated in the justice and public security component of this
strategy” mainly “as young women are being increasingly affected by the gang
phenomenon (both as members and victims)”78.
Nevertheless, there is no gender-related performance indicator in any of the available
documents so it will be more difficult to appreciate the results of the EC strategy in this
domain. In addition, none of the ten expected results of the PASS refers explicitly to this
cross-cutting issue. The DTAs mention a strong presence of women in the beneficiary
institutions and this has been verified to some extent during the field phase; but this does
not mean that the programme integrated the gender dimension.
4.6 EQ 6 on LRRD
EQ6: To what extent did the EC interventions with respect to rehabilitation
following Hurricane Mitch link relief, rehabilitation and development?
Hurricane Mitch (October/November 1998) was probably the worst natural disaster suffered by Central America
in the 20th century. The EC’s response involved the Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) and the external
cooperation of the EC (in this case the then Directorates-General External Relation and EuropeAid ). The action of
ECHO was relief focused (although it did play a role on the rehabilitation front) and encompassed different projects
for a total budget of € 39.79 million, while the external cooperation designed a medium to long-term programme of
€256 million meant to contribute to rehabilitation and to sustainable development in the region. This major
programme was called the Regional Programme for the Reconstruction of Central America (PRRAC) and, despite
its name, consisted of four sub programmes implemented at the national level. The total budget for the sub programme
Honduras was €119 million, and it led to the implementation of five main projects.79
This programme is additionally included in the evaluation because Honduras is one of the cases where the link
between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) can be examined and from which lessons can be drawn for
the future. The rehabilitation programme alone represents one third of total EC commitments during the evaluation
period. The country is very vulnerable to natural disasters; it suffers regularly from hurricanes which are becoming
more frequent and violent. Hence, the importance of disaster preparedness and the need to understand how to
consolidate the country’s own institutions to cope with disasters.
This question does not address the direct effectiveness or impact of the rehabilitation programme itself, which have been
analysed in the general evaluation of PRRAC in 2009, but the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the LRRD
approach. It assesses hereby coordination between EC interventions, and also with other donors’ interventions.
Furthermore it presents a structure similar to that in the Nicaragua country evaluation80 in order to allow for
comparisons between two country programmes which, although very similar, were in fact independent in their
execution.
78 Idem, p. 29.
79 PRRAC ASAN, a large-scale hydraulic project delivered to national institutions; PRRAC AGUA-HIGIENE RURAL
and PRRAC SCI, small-scale hydraulic projects delivered to local institutions; PRRAC SALED, a project in the
education and health sectors; PRRAC DESAROLLO LOCAL, a training and institutional development project.
80 Evaluation of EC cooperation with Nicaragua, ADE, 2009
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EQ 6 on LRRD – Answer Summary Box
Following Hurricane Mitch, the EC intervened notably through its humanitarian office
ECHO and with the “Regional Programme for the Reconstruction of Central America”
(PRRAC). While ECHO focused on relief operations, the PRRAC played a key role in
rehabilitation and development. However, such linkage between the different stages was
hampered by the differences in institutional set-up and dynamics between ECHO and
PRRAC operations. Furthermore, the PRRAC was identified and designed when the EC’s
external aid was being devolved to the delegation in Managua, which did not yet have the
capacity to manage such a large programme. These factors caused a gap in the global
response of the EC to the hurricane and meant that there was a delay of two years
between the end of ECHO operations and the beginning of the PRRAC activities. Since
the mid-2000s concrete measures have been taken to remediate this situation such as an
increased collaboration notably through the ECHO focal point in the Delegation. Despite
these coordination efforts in the past years, linking ECHO actions with the activities
undertaken under the EC’s bilateral and regional cooperation framework remains a
challenge as these projects continue to have very different dynamics and timelines.
Another lesson that the EC has learned from the PRRAC is the necessity to do more on
disaster preparedness. In this respect, the Regional Programme for the Reduction of
Vulnerability and Environmental Degradation (PREVDA) was launched as a follow-up
programme notably to address this issue.
4.6.1 Concrete relations between relief operations, rehabilitation, and
development programmes (JC 6.1 and JC 6.2)
The EC responded promptly to the disaster by approving its first emergency programme
within ten days after the hurricane (the first ECHO aid of € 6.8 million). ECHO’s second
decision (taken in December 1998 for a total of € 9.5 million) began to incorporate
rehabilitation components. Even though ECHO’s intervention was focused on the
emergency stage, it ended up playing a key role in rehabilitation (rehabilitation accounted
for 20.4% of overall humanitarian aid); it also continued longer than planned with the EC
still approving activities to complete ECHO’s Global Plan in August 2000. Despite this
expanded role played by ECHO and the fact that its Global Plan considered the PRRAC as
the logical continuation to its actions,81 a smooth transition did not occur. The first
Financing Agreement of the PRRAC signed for the sub-programme Honduras in July 2000
does not refer to the operations financed by ECHO thus illustrating the lack of explicit
synergies foreseen between these operations at the design stage. In the event, there was a
delay of approximately two years between the end of ECHO operations and the first
implementation phases of the PRRAC programme. This delay can be explained by three
major factors:
81 “This plan [the EC Action Plan] is to guarantee the link between the emergency stage (responsibility of ECHO) and the rehabilitation
stage. The key component of this Plan is the PRRAC.” ECHO, Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of ECHO’s Aid to the Victims
of Hurricane Mitch ECHO/EVA/210/2000/01007, p.2.
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 The difficulty of articulating relief, rehabilitation and development projects that do not
have the same dynamics and timeline, with additional coordinating difficulties
originating from a relief and emergency context.82
 The fact that ECHO and PRRAC operations were managed under different
administrative umbrellas, which prevented the establishment of concrete and
constructive relations between the stages of rehabilitation and development. For
example, the identification work done by ECHO could not be capitalised upon under
the PRRAC projects because they were managed by different administrative units who
did not cooperate closely.83
 Finally, difficulties stemming from the fact that the EC was undergoing a process of
devolution of its external assistance with management responsibilities being transferred
from HQs to the Regional Delegation in Managua. An innovative structure had to be
put in place at the level of the Delegation to manage the PRRAC and it was not yet
prepared to implement such a large programme.
Since the mid-2000s, efforts have been made to increase collaboration between ECHO and
the EC Delegations in the region notably by putting ECHO focal points in all the
delegations in Central America. Furthermore, ECHO submit the project proposals it
receives for disaster preparedness projects to the evaluation of the delegations. According
to members from both institutions, this collaboration on DIPECHO projects has been
beneficial in terms of knowing who does what. At the level of Honduras, although there is
now a better information flow between the different EC services, it has not yet resulted in
joint actions or even in creating synergies between projects funded by the different
instruments and managed by the different services. A few exceptions were however noted,
such as the initiative to coordinate the disaster preparedness project of ECHO in the
Patuca basin with the FORCUENCAS project.
4.6.2 Rehabilitation operations and the issue of disaster preparedness
(JC 6.3)
While the EC acknowledged the need to pay special attention to disaster preparedness in its
policy and included this issue in the design of the PRRAC programme, such weight was
not reflected at the implementation level. The 2001 EC Communication on LRRD
mentions that the pursuit of linkage is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition
from emergency to development assistance and that it must be seen as part of an integrated
approach towards preventing crises and disasters, in particular through disaster
preparedness.84 One of the three specific objectives of the PRRAC is: “the preparation and
82 In this respect, ECHO emphasized that it has been easier to collaborate when the more flexible Instrument for
Stability was used.
83 An evaluation of ECHO’s aid to the victims of Hurricane Mitch conducted in 2001 describes in this respect: “Linking
emergency and development remains a dead letter as long as ECHO and development agencies within the EU,
especially PRRAC, keep on operating under separate administrative umbrellas.[…] This is especially true for the
rehabilitation, and water & sanitation sector. In these cases (administrative) integration of ECHO or at least strong
inter-co-operation with the development services of the EU is strongly recommended.” Source: Quest-Consult, Post-
Mitch ECHO evaluation, Global Plans 1998, 1999 and 2000: Rehabilitation Sector, 2001, p. iv.
84 EC, Communication from the EC to the Council and the Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and
Development – An assessment, COM(2001) 153 final, 23.04.2001; p. 6
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launching of the normative framework of risk prevention and reducing the impact of these
types of natural disasters”. But, at the implementation level, the PRRAC projects in general
had a “risk management” component that was very weak: it was mentioned as a cross-
cutting issue with no concrete actions planned in the domain.85. This lack of emphasis put
on risk prevention combined with the fact that none of the PRRAC projects had a regional
vision was perceived by EC officials as a missed opportunity in the sense that risk
preparedness is especially relevant at the regional level.86 Nevertheless, the EC has tried to
remediate this missed opportunity by designing a regional follow-up programme on
Reduction of Vulnerability and Environmental Degradation (PREVDA). This programme
will further be discussed under JC 6.5.
4.6.3 Coordination between rehabilitation interventions and other donors’
interventions (focusing on EU MS) (JC 6.4)
After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the international community set up a joint coordination
structure to maximise the impact of the aid to be delivered to Central America. Concretely,
an operational and well-structured group of 16 donors -the so-called G-16- was created.
The existence of such a structure has helped the EC in its effort to coordinate its
programme with those of other donors. In its 1999 Communication to the Council and the
European Parliament introducing the PRRAC, the EC specified that the programme’s areas
of intervention and content were determined according to four criteria, one of them being
“the existence of other projects by the Community, the Member States or other donors.”87 The final 2009
evaluation of the PRRAC argued that the EC should have played a more influential role
within the donors’ group (by being a member of the Monitoring Group for example).88
Nevertheless, there was good coordination between the EC and other donors immediately
after the disaster, defining both geographic and thematic areas of intervention.89 Such
coordination allowed major contradictions or duplications during the implementation
phase to be avoided but it was not sufficiently strong to plan synergies between other
donors’ interventions and PRRAC’s projects in general. These synergies when they
occurred happened rather on an ad hoc basis.90
85 This observation, however, does not apply to the PRRAC Desarollo local which had as one of its objectives the
strengthening of the government body in charge of disaster preparedness and risk prevention COPECO (Comisión
Permanente de Contingencias).
86 An EC staff member explains in this respect: “[A]n opportunity was lost to strengthen the regional integration in the sectors of
risks management, protection of the environment, and management of water resources where such integration is so relevant.”
87 EC, Communication from the EC to the Council and the Parliament on a Community Action Plan for the
Reconstruction of Central America, COM(1999)201, 28.04.1999; p. 8.
88 Transtec-Sher, Global Evaluation of the Regional Programme for Reconstruction in Central
America(PRRAC), July 2009, p.21. The Monitoring Group was made up of Germany, Canada,
Spain, Sweden, the United States and Japan.
89 Idem, p. 69.
90 For example, as a result of the EC and Italian Cooperation joining efforts, the number of beneficiaries of the La Vega
water treatment plant in Tegucigalpa could be substantially increased without having to increase funding.
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4.6.4 Sustainability of rehabilitation and development interventions (JC
6.5)
The centralised management modality (as opposed to decentralised management where
implementation tasks such as finances and contracts are delegated to third countries) which
was selected for implementing the majority of the PRRAC projects did not favour dialogue
with either national authorities or civil society. The sustainability of the EC supported
interventions was further undermined by the fact that a majority of the projects (90% of
the total budget) were manned and managed by PMUs with virtually no capacity building
of national institutions.91 Even though such choice may have been motivated by the fact
that governments of the regions were overwhelmed in the aftermath of the hurricane, more
attention should have been given to the capacity of national institutions. The EC
acknowledges in its CSP 2007-2013 that this is a lesson to be learned from the PRRAC:
“As to the PRRAC, one of the most important lessons is that such programmes should
include a component specifically designed to assist and strengthen the public institutions
responsible for long-term sector strategies.”92
The EC continues to support the same sectors where the PRRAC was active and has
funded a follow-up programme (PREVDA). It is, for instance, still supporting the water
sector. The rural communities which have benefitted from PRRAC-AGUA have asked for
their files to now be managed within the framework of FORCUENCAS. The PREVDA
programme is to address this issue of sustainability notably by intervening at the political
and organisational level in order to strengthen the management of risk, the protection of
the environment and the management of water.
91 An EC staff member wished to emphasise that there were also examples of good experiences with heads of PMUs
working in close collaboration with local authorities. This was the case in Honduras with the PRRAC Desarollo local.
92 Country Strategy Paper Honduras 2007-2013, p.19.
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4.7 EQ 7 on Budget Support
EQ7: To what extent have the EC’s interventions through Budget Support been
adapted to the national context, and to what extent have they contributed to
strengthening the framework for public policy and expenditure?
This question focuses on the adaptation of the instrument to the Honduran macroeconomic, political and
administrative context, using Step 1 of the methodology for the evaluation of budget support (BS) presented in the
Issue Paper of May 2008 ('Methodologies for Evaluations of Budget Support Operations at Country level', by
E.Caputo (DRN), A.Lawson (ODI), M.v.d.Linde (ECORYS)). As explained in section 3.3 above, Step 1 of
the methodology covers the first three levels of the evaluation framework as follows: (i) GBS/SBS inputs by donors
defined as including funds, policy dialogue, conditionality, technical assistance/capacity building (TA/CB), alignment
to government policies and systems, harmonisation between donors, (ii) direct outputs (improvements expected in
relationship between external assistance and the national budget and policy processes), and (iii) induced outputs
(positive changes expected in the financing and institutional framework for public spending and public policy, and
consequent improvements in public policy management and service delivery). Step 1 thus excludes the appreciation of
outcomes (level 4) and impacts (Level 5).
There are, presently, three cases of budget support in Honduras, two of which were approved during the 2002-2006
period, and one corresponds to the CSP 2007-2013 (APERP):
 PROADES: commitment approved in 2004 for €34m sector budget support to decentralisation,
 PASAH: commitment also approved in 2004 for a €14m sector budget support to food security, and
 APERP: a commitment approved in 2008 for a €60.5m general budget support to the PRSP in the field of
education and health.
EQ 7 on Budget Support – Answer Summary Box
The EC used budget support in a difficult economic, political and administrative context.
It reacted to this environment with a mixture of rigour and flexibility. The EC showed
flexibility in particular by (i) adapting its procedures to the political and economic context
evolutions (in APERP, PROADES and PASAH), (ii) adapting the ATI functioning to the
local situation (in PROADES and PASAH), and (iii) adapting the calendar and conditions
of APERP/APN to the Government’s new decentralisation policy.
Disbursements did not reach their potential amounts due to the deterioration of the
macroeconomic situation and the partial fulfilment of sector goals. After the 2009 political
crisis, cooperation with the GoH (and thus budget support) was halted altogether.
Therefore the total disbursement rate was low at the end of the 2002-2009 evaluation
period: 51% 93.
The induced outputs of the budget support concerned their effect on the framework for
93 For PROADES and PASAH, total commitments and disbursements (excluding ITA) were the following:
Committed (million €) Disbursed (million €)
PROADES 32 16.4
PASAH 12.4 6.1
TOTAL 44.4 22.5
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EQ 7 on Budget Support – Answer Summary Box
public policy and expenditures which was strong in one case (PASAH) and weak in the
other (PROADES):
 Although a public financial management (PFM) indicator was included in two of the
BS programmes, improvement of PFM was not directly supported by the two sector
budget supports. During the period PFM performance was mixed: improvement from
2002 to 2007 was followed by deterioration between 2007 and 2009. Through the
policy dialogue linked to the implementation of the PASAH, the EC contributed to
improving inter-ministerial coordination and budget allocation to food security.
 Because of the discontinuation of the decentralisation policy from 2008 to 2009,
PROADES became partially obsolete and policy dialogue had little effect. However
the importance of decentralisation rose again since 2010.
 The policy dialogue conducted through PASAH had an important effect on the policy
strategy of the GoH on food security (i) by supporting the drafting of a new law on
food security, (ii) by encouraging consultation and coordination at all levels, (iii) by
improving institutional organisation on food security, and (iv) by supporting the
technical organisation of a conditional cash transfer system.
4.7.1 Adaptation to the national context (JC 7.1)
The EC budget support interventions have on the whole been regularly adapted to the
macroeconomic and national policy and political context. The main elements that can be
highlighted are the following:
 The Central Government deficit, which averaged 5.2% of GDP from 2000 to 2004,
declined sharply thereafter and was nil in 2006. However it began to rise rapidly again,
reaching 4.5% of GDP in 2008 and 6.5% in 2009, a year of acute political and
economic crisis. From 2007 to 2009 the deficit moved from € 85.7m to € 681.2m, an
8-fold increase in only two years. Despite this rather high deficit level reached in 2009,
Honduras had no major external indebtedness problem, but a high internal debt
(especially towards national pension funds) and a serious problem of budget
orientation, with excess weight given to current expenditure over capital expenditure,
and an excess weight of wages and salaries within current expenditure.
In this context, the EC budget support programme94 which could have represented a
maximum of 18% of the deficit in 2007 (if all commitments had been disbursed) only
represented 4% of the deficit in 2008 and 0.6% in 200995. From a strict macroeconomic
point of view it therefore had little significance96.
94 The total disbursements committed (not effectively disbursed) by PASAH and PROADES were €15.5m in 2007,
€14.9m in 2008 and €4m in 2009.
95 These figures are calculated taking into account the disbursements initially committed for these 3 years and not the
amounts effectively disbursed.
96 These same figures would have represented 4% of the budget of capital expenditure in 2007, but much less than one
percent in 2009. See Annex 7, I-7.1.2.
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 In Honduras, budget support interventions were designed to support precise policies
(poverty reduction strategy - PRS, decentralisation, food security) but the political
anchorage of these policies proved with hindsight to be rather weak:
- The PRS, which seemed firmly accepted in 2001, did not enjoy the same priority
at the end of Zelayas’ government. The present Lobo government put forward a
“Visión de País 2038” and a “Plan de Nación” which contains elements of a PRS97.
- The decentralisation policy was never fully accepted even by the Maduro
administration and was quickly set aside by the following government (Zelaya). In
2010 the Lobo administration designed a new “strategic plan” called “Plan
Estratégico 2010-2014 Descentralización para el desarrollo local en el marco de la visión de
país 2038”. However it is still too early to appreciate its importance.
- The food security policy was hardly coherent at the beginning of the Maduro
government when PASAH was being set up, but soon became a priority and was
confirmed as such by the Zelaya government. The last period, starting in 2010,
corresponds again to a high priority given to Food Security. Its present status has
been reinforced and a law on food security has been passed in March 2011. This is
a clear State policy.
 International Technical Assistance (ITA) was especially important because, according
to PEFA98, to different WB and other documents99 and to staff from the GoH and
donors, there was a serious problem of administrative capacity in Honduras. The
radical turnover of administrative and technical staff with each new government and
the absence of a civil service system based on merit leads Honduras to “score below
average on all the qualitative indicators developed by the IDB, indicating serious deficiencies in most
areas of human resource management.”100 As a consequence “the BS modality is experiencing
considerable difficulties in Honduras due to the GoH's limited ability to correctly manage this type of
intervention and generalised institutional weaknesses”.101 High quality technical assistance was
provided (although late) and was well adapted to the national context (see 4.7.5)..
 Up to a certain point the risk factor related to political instability, to lack of continuity
of public policies, and to a lack of a common donor approach or strategy, was taken
into account by the EC (see 4.7.2).
97 These two long term plans, the first with a 28-year horizon and the second only 12 years, were agreed on between the
two main political parties (Liberal and National) just before the November 2009 presidential election. The EC is
supporting this new plan through APERP. An addenda to the FA was signed in October 2010 and a first
disbursement of €14m was decided in November.
98 Honduras: Evaluación del Desempeño del Gasto Público y la Rendición de cuentas (PEFA) – Gestión de las
Finanzas Públicas, Informe Preliminar, Versión 2, 18 de diciembre 2008.
99 See for example: “Strengthening performance accountability in Honduras”, WB, 2009; “Honduras – Public
Expenditure Review”, Vol I and II, WB, November 19, 2007, Report No 39251-HO; “Honduras – Difficile
émergence d’une nation, d’un état”, André-Marcel d’Ans, Ed. Karthala, 1997.
100 Such as planning, job organisation, employment management, performance management, compensation, career
development, and human and social relations. See “Strengthening performance…” Op. cit. p.20.
101 EARN 2007: p.3.
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4.7.2 Implementation (JC 7.2)
The national context was characterised by a weak administrative capacity, a general
institutional weakness, and the lack of a strong and coherent political project. With these
structural issues, Budget Support has inevitably faced problems in attaining agreed targets.
These difficulties were aggravated by three other causes in 2008 and 2009 which affected
the payment conditions and overall cooperation:
 A shift in public policy away from decentralisation since 2008 gave PROADES little
relevance.
 The deterioration, since 2008, of the international economic context and of the
Honduran economic policy led to the multilateral donors suspending budget support in
September 2008.
 The political events of June 2009, which provoked the interruption of cooperation of
most countries - the EC resumed its cooperation in March 2010.
The adaptation of EC budget support to this situation and events has been mixed.
At the design level, policy dialogue has been good in all three programmes but the GoH
did not show a strong negotiating will. According to EC sources: procedures, conditions
and targets of BS were accepted with little discussion but they were not always well
understood102.
On the question of risk during the preparation phase, APERP’s financial agreement took
into account the political risk and asked to proceed to a political risk evaluation of each
indicator. Some preparatory documents of PROADES stress the political risk103 and
suggest a close monitoring of PFM during the implementation phase. Regarding the policy
risk, PROADES preparatory documents clearly acknowledged it. Generally, the
preparation phase of BS programmes takes full account of the risks involving these
programmes but suggests few practical solutions104.
102 The system of fixed and variable tranches, indicators and objectives is sometimes complex but considerable progress
has been made recently in order to simplify indicators/conditions: these are now less numerous (although APERP
VT includes 13 indicators), simpler and more reliable than before. But the modality, because of its many indicators,
still requires a good system of accounting, monitoring and reporting that may be missing, especially at a local level.
See for example VT indicators/conditions 5 and 8 of PROADES, or 3, 4 and 5 of PASAH. When receiving the first
PROADES FT disbursement, SEFIN acknowledged it by introducing a “PROADES” line in the income budget. It
promptly introduced a similar “PROADES” line in the expenditure budget. See Annex 8, I-7.2.1.
103 The political risk is the risk of social unrest, interruption of the constitutional order, etc. linked to political reasons.
The policy risk is the risk that a new government decides to change the policy which is supported by a BS
programme. The fiduciary risk is the risk of embezzlement of donor’s funds.
104 However, at the moment of approval of PASAH and PROADES (2004) Honduras was enjoying a long period of
political stability (civil governments regularly elected since 1981) and had also experienced a period of relative
economic stability (slow growth and one digit inflation) since 2000. The first warnings of problems linked to
economic policy management came in late 2007 and the country was off-track of the IMF stand-by agreement in
September 2008.
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At the implementation level, the situation of each of the three BS programmes was the
following:
APERP’s Financial Agreement was signed in December 2009 without defining indicators
and conditions in order to follow negotiations with the newly-elected government which
was installed at the end of January 2010.
These negotiations started in August 2010. In November a new addendum was signed
changing APERP into APN (Apoyo al Plan Nación), defining a new disbursement
calendar105 and establishing a set of conditions and targets for the fixed and variable
tranches. In December 2010, the first FT disbursement (€14m) was approved.
This illustrates the adaptation of the APERP budget support procedures to the national
context and to the exceptional political circumstances.
PROADES was confronted with the deterioration of the country’s financial position
(budget deficit and international reserves) and the abandonment of the decentralisation
policy, which led to a rather low level of disbursement (€16.4m out of €32m or 51%).
PROADES was supported by a consultation and monitoring committee (FTD) composed
of representatives of GoH, donors and civil society106. This committee guaranteed donor’s
coordination on decentralisation policy.
A new addendum was signed at the end of 2010 to organise the conditions and
disbursement calendar of the €15.6m not approved during the main phase. This will consist
of a FT of €5.6m in 2011 and two VTs of €5m each in 2012 and 2013.
PASAH was confronted with unfulfilled macro-economic conditions, unattained target
indicators, and the decision to suspend all disbursements after the 2009 events, which
resulted also in a low level of disbursement between 2006 and 2010 (€6.1m out of €12.4m
or 49%). The main phase of the programme ended in December 2010 and a phasing-out is
planned to start in 2011. A new addendum was signed in 2010 with the present
government in order to organise the conditions and disbursement calendar of the €3.6m
not approved during the main phase, plus the €2m initially planned for the 2-year phasing-
out period.
105 This calendar includes one FT disbursement in 2010 (€14m) and four VT disbursements totaling €45.1m, from 2011
to 2014.
106 The “Foro Tripartito de Descentralización( (FTD) monitored the public policy on decentralization. It was inactive
after June 2009 during the interruption of cooperation, but met twice in 2010.
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On the implementation difficulties in PROADES and PASAH relating to the changing
macroeconomic and political contexts, the following elements may be highlighted:
 The EC followed the deteriorating macroeconomic situation in Honduras and its risks
to the BS programmes. An internal "Early Warning" Note on Budget Support dated 14
May 2009 stated for instance that “there are grounds for serious doubt that the
Government of Honduras (GoH) will fulfil the eligibility criteria for disbursement”.
 Three Fixed Tranches out of seven could not be disbursed because the macroeconomic
conditions were not fulfilled. All four Variable Tranches (VT) were only partially
disbursed because some targets were not or partially attained107.
 Half of the disbursements were made late108, mostly for reasons linked to
administrative problems on the beneficiary side. It affected the predictability of the BS
programmes.
 Because of the uncertainty on the macro situation since 2007, the VT disbursements
took place in the same year as the macroeconomic assessment. Therefore these
disbursements were not included in the budget proforma (budget proposal before the
execution period) and were subject to budget extensions109 This reflected short term
necessities, which should be lifted as soon as the country regains macroeconomic
stability because it hinders predictability, an adequate planning of the budget execution,
and a scrutiny by Parliament of a realistic budget proposal.
 After the 2002-2009 evaluation period, at the end of 2010, the EC decided to re-
programme all remnant funds from the unpaid variable and fixed tranches from both
PROADES and PASAH.
107 The FT that were not approved because of macroeconomic conditions were PROADES FT3 (€3m) and FT4 (€3m),
and PASAH FT3 (€1,5m). The VT approved were:
PASAH VT1 45% disbursed Out of €2.5m
VT2 80% 3.4m
PROADES VT1 65% 7.0m
VT2 55% 7.0m
108 More precisely, out of eight disbursements from 2005 to 2009, four were disbursed on time (PROADES FT1 and
FT2, PASAH FT1 and FT2) and four were late (PROADES VT1, VT2, PASAH VT1, VT2). However the “timely”
PASAH FT disbursements were executed in December, at the very end of the budget year..
109 However, from 2007 to 2010 the budget was presented with considerable delay to the parliament, or not presented at
all. Besides, one of the strong recommendations of the IMF in the stand-by arrangementof October 2010, was that
theGoH should incorporate external donor commitments in the budget presented to Parliament. Between 2007 and
2009 the increases added during the execution period of the budget represented between 22 and 27% of the initial
budget.
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4.7.3 PFM improvement (JC 7.3)
The PFM performance
There were clearly three different periods in the PFM performance.
1. According to the last PEFA, PFM in Honduras has improved from 2003 to
2007 (the time span of PEFA) and started from a very low level.
In order to evaluate PFM performance, the PEFA method uses six main (or high level)
indicators, which each contain between two and nine different criteria, and each criterion is
given a performance mark. The following table shows the results for the last two PEFA
evaluations of Honduras, as a percentage (0 is worst, 100 is best)110.
Table 9: Evolution of PEFA evaluation results
Indicator No ofcriteria 2005 (%) 2008 (%)
1. Budget is credible 4 50 72
2. Information is significant and transparent 6 57.5 42
3. Budget is based on policies 2 44 69
4. Budget is predictable and controlled 9 37.5 51
5. Accounts, registration and reports 4 53 50
6. Legislative control and external audit 3 29 46
7. Donors practices 3 n.d. 37.5
The 2008 evaluation gives a higher mark than the previous one (2005) for four out of six
indicators. More importantly, both evaluations almost concur in that the worst indicator is
the legislative control and external audit: public finance is scarcely checked and Parliament
does not play its part. According to the 2008 PEFA, budget credibility is good (the budget
is realistic and is executed according to schedule), while the amount, significance and
transparency of budgetary information are still insufficient111.
Another noticeable result is the bad mark (the second worst) for donor practices:
disbursements are unpredictable, information offered by donors on their programmes is
scarce, and application of national rules by donors is rather exceptional.
The PEFA report concludes that the progress made during those five years in reforming
the PFM system is significant, and that in consequence PFM is more cautious and
disciplined. The main elements outlined by the report are the following:
 Subsystems of financial programming, budget execution and accounting have been
integrated, modernized and centralized.
 Execution and control of disbursements are more effective and public expenditure is
more transparent.
 A unique treasury account has been established in 2006.
110 Use of percentages responds to a reading facility. Scale from 1 to 4 has been converted to a scale from 0 to 100 (0 is
1- while 100 is 4+, 50 is 2+).
111 However the budgets (income and expenditure) can be consulted on the internet at three different levels (up until
2009): (i) budget approved by Parliament, (ii) budget extension during the execution phase, (iii) budget really
executed. The 2011 budget was made available in December 2010.
Evaluation of the EC’s co-operation with Honduras
ADE-DRN
Final Report April 2012 Page 60
On the negative side, the main PEFA findings that have immediate consequences for
international cooperation are the following:
 Information on external aid is incomplete, fragmented and outdated
 There is no strategic planning of public investment (no long term prevision on what
should be financed).
 There is no financial follow-up (provisions) for maintenance of public capital goods.
 Some weaknesses still remain in the information and in the public procurement system
that renders difficult the execution of public projects.
2. From 2007 to 2009 PFM has clearly deteriorated, as shown by many sources.
The budget was not sent to Parliament in time in 2007, 2008 or 2009.112 The CPIA
(Country Policy and Institutional Management) evaluation of the “Public
Management and Institutions” cluster shows that the result for Honduras has been
worsening since 2007113. As a consequence, four donors (Germany, Sweden, World
Bank and IBD) suspended their budget support at the end of 2008, before the
political crisis of June 2009 114.
3. Since 2010 some PFM aspects have improved, such as the timely presentation
of the 2011 budget in the Parliament and its discussion, and an improvement in the
composition of the public debt through loans from IDB and WB115.
EC role
The EC’s influence on this mixed performance was found at two levels:
1. The two sector BS programmes were oriented towards an improvement of sector
policies on food security and decentralisation (see section 4.7.4). They each
included an indicator on PFM improvement but did not consider precise
instruments in order to attain this objective. For example, the EC did not
participate in a PFM training programme organized by the WB and the IDB for
Honduran officials. Therefore the influence of the two sector BS programmes was
probably limited to an indirect incentive through discussions with SEFIN on the
PFM indicator (in the case of PASAH) and through conditionality. However it
must be stressed that the policy dialogue conducted through PASAH helped
112 Source: “Early Warning on Budget Support” by DELHon from May 14, 2009 - reunions y notas – Proades2
113 The CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Management) is divided in four clusters. Cluster number three refers to
“Public Management and Institutions”. A mark from one (low) to six (high) is given, founded on the five main
criteria.
Results for Honduras are the following :
2005 3.5
2006 3.5
2007 3.5
2008 3.4
2009 3.3
This puts Honduras at about the same level as countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Benin,
Mozambique or Mongolia. See Annex 8 JC 7.3
114 See “EC Mid-Term Review of the country strategy for 2007-2013 – Honduras”, 2010, p.10.
115 See IMF Request for a Stand-By Arrangement, October 2010.
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improve the inter-ministerial coordination and increase the budget of the public
institutions dedicated to food security. Also, the EC aimed at improving directly the
public administration through two technical assistance programmes: PRAP
committed in 2002 and PAAPIR committed in 2008116.
2. At a more general level the results of the PEFA evaluation organised by the EC in
2008-2009 were published in October 2010 by SEFIN and thus can now represent
the base line of a future monitoring of the PFM progress. This publication is
certainly an improvement in the transparency of PFM.
4.7.4 Support to public policies and policy dialogue (JC 7.4)
The two BS programmes implemented (PROADES and PASAH) offer very different
results and will be analysed separately.
PROADES was designed to support the decentralisation policy through support to
PRODDEL (a public decentralisation programme) and the Secretary of Government and
Justice (SGJ). As decentralisation progressively ceased to be a priority for the GoH from
2007 onwards, the EC’s Budget support to decentralisation and its associated policy
dialogue also lost impetus. With little progress being made in reaching the pre-agreed target
indicators, no more than half the funds could effectively be disbursed. Concomitantly,
budget allocations to SGJ and PRODDEL117 remained low. Public decentralisation policy
was increasingly inadequate and ineffective. However, as will be seen, PROADES had a
longer term effect by improving information and analysis available in Honduras on
decentralisation and thus preparing the present sector policy.
PASAH, supported by a State policy on food security, started with the first PRS before
2004. Despite delayed and low disbursement due to the targets not being reached (no more
than 36% of funds committed had been disbursed before June 2010), a very effective
policy dialogue took place and helped improving both the policy design and its
implementation as follows (see also 4.3.3):
 Policy design:
- Helping to draft the National Strategy on Food and Nutritional Security (2010)
- Supporting the preparation of the law on FS which was passed in March 2011.
 Implementation of policy:
- Supporting coordination between all actors involved in FS (public sector, civil
society and external donors)
- Designing an instrument to focus a conditional cash transfer programme
towards the poorest.
116 PRAP (Apoyo a la Modernización de la Administración Pública en Honduras) and PAAPIR (Programa de Apoyo a la
Administración Pública y a la Integración Regional) were not included in the sample of interventions for analysis in
this evaluation. See section 3.2.
117 A fundamental principle of non-targeted budget support is that the budgetary allocation between sectors or ministries
should respect Government priorities. Therefore SBS disbursements do not provoke an automatic increase in the
sectoral budget. Because funds are transferred to the general Treasury Account, are managed by the Minister of
Finance, and normally respect the budget allocation proposed by Government and agreed by Parliament, the sectoral
Ministry does not always “see” the funds and may well not “feel” any difference in financial terms.
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4.7.5 International Technical Assistance (JC 7.3 and JC 7.4)
On the adequacy of ITA and results obtained, the following elements may be highlighted.
 For the reasons stressed in 4.7.1 and linked to the Honduran context (lack of
administrative capacity), technical assistance was important in both budget support
programmes. In PASAH this assistance was provided by a team of two experts which
on the one hand supported the planning in 44 municipalities for sustainable
management of natural resources and the preparation and follow-up of small
productive projects. On the other hand, at a central level, the team supported
improvements in policy design, drafting a new law on food security, the design of a
new system of information and indicators, etc118. The ITA team in PROADES was
composed of three experts and their work was mainly focused on decentralisation
policies, municipal tax system and municipal planning.
 Both technical assistance programmes began late. PROADES ITA began almost three
years after the beginning of the Budget Support119 in a moment when the political
interest on decentralisation was very low and thus little could be done to improve the
effectiveness of PROADES. In the case of PASAH the ITA team arrived in July 2008,
more than a year after the official implementation of the programme and a year and a
half after the first disbursement (December 2006). This provoked a considerable delay
in the PASAH implementation because little had been done before the beginning of
the ITA, both at the central level (at policy, legislative and administrative levels, on
coordination, resource allocation to food security, etc.) and at the field level.
 According to GoH and EC sources, both ITA teams were of very good quality and
adequate in terms of professional skills. However the PROADES team should have
had previous experience in budget support.
 All cooperation activities were halted after June 2009 for more than a year. Both teams
devoted time to studies and analysis which proved useful when the programmes were
resumed120.
 According to sources from the GoH, both ITA teams were useful, not only for their
capacities, but also in providing information and continuity at each change of
government so that memory and past efforts would not be lost. It is stressed that in a
weak State, ITA teams have an important role to play in facilitating transitions, in
addition to capacity building.
 Even though both BS had low disbursement rates (49% for PASAH and 51% for
PROADES) and good ITA, very different achievements were attained for the reasons
described below.
These two ITA programmes were very different in terms of effectiveness. While PASAH
achieved concrete, useful and immediately applicable results, PROADES did not share the
118 Section 4.3.3 provides a list of the main results obtained by the PASAH ATI.
119 The PROADES first FT was disbursed in August 2005 and the ITA mission started in May 2008. See Evaluación
Global de PROADES, 2010, p. 6.
120 The PASAH ATI team prepared in 2009 the first report in Honduras on the present situation of food and nutritional
security. This report was endorsed and published by the GoH in 2010.
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same success from 2005 to 2009. However some of the ITA team’s outputs are now being
used to prepare the present decentralisation plan (APN).
The following table illustrates the main reasons of these differences in achievements.
PASAH PROADES
Supported a State policy common to three
successive governments and which is still
gaining political importance
Supported a policy which was never fully agreed
on and which was abandoned between 2007 and
2009
Was attached to a Secretary (SP) influential on
the political scene
Was attached to a Secretary (SJG) weak on the
political scene
ITA team was located inside the Ministry, close
to the levels of decision
ITA team was located in a different building
from the SJG
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4.8 EQ 8 on Aid Modalities
EQ8: To what extent were the chosen EC aid modalities adequate in the national
context?
This Evaluation Question aims at assessing the overall adequateness of the (mix of) aid modalities chosen
for EC cooperation in Honduras. In this exercise the evaluators apply the term ‘aid modality’ to a variety
of cases, including for instance project and budget approaches; centralised, decentralised or delegated
management; and geographical or thematic budget lines. The assessment is based on a study at the level of
individual interventions selected for the desk and field phases.
EQ 8 on Aid Modalities – Answer Summary Box
A variety of ‘aid modalities’ were used in the EC’s cooperation with Honduras, reflecting
the possibilities in the specific situation and time in which the interventions were initiated
and the possibilities offered by EC financial instruments of that time. Budget support was
the preferred vehicle for aid delivery during the period. Overall, the choice of EC aid
modalities at the time of decision can be considered as adequate with regard to the context
of intervention for all project approaches examined. The sector budget support modality
was further a success factor for aid in food security. Regarding the sector budget support
to the decentralisation policy, few results have been obtained owing mainly to the
discontinuation of this policy; but it is difficult to conclude on the adequacy of the
modality. In the global budget support it is too early to have a clear view as it was
launched recently.
4.8.1 Situation: a mix of modalities (JC 8.4)
Overall, a variety of ‘aid modalities’ was used in Honduras over the evaluation
period, as presented schematically in the figure below. In addition, the inventory in
Annex 3 provides an overview of all financial instruments used.
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Figure 7: EC management modalities in Honduras121
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4.8.2 Rationale for the choice of aid modalities (JC 8.2 and 8.3)
The observed mix of modalities is a consequence of a variety of situations and
considerations. In general, it did not really owe to a deliberate willingness to have a variety
of aid modalities in the country, for instance with a view to spreading risks or strengthening
different kinds of implementing partners. For all interventions examined, it reflected
essentially the possibilities in the specific situation and time in which the interventions were
to take place, the objectives pursued and the possibilities with the EC financial instruments
of that time.
A recurrent theme in the cooperation was that budget support was the ‘first option’
aid modality. Budget support was considered as the preferred vehicle for aid delivery by
the EC in its cooperation with Honduras whenever it was possible. This was fully coherent
with the 2005 European Consensus on Development and an internationally agreed
principle laid down in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. Budget support represented 43
percent of all commitments (excluding PRRAC) during the evaluation period. Other
modalities were used notably when BS was impossible (e.g. without a sector policy there
could be no sector budget support, such as in the area of vocational training) or when it
was clearly inappropriate (e.g. for reasons relating to the GoH policy such as in public
security122).
121 The complexity of EC modalities and their evolution has been simplified where needed.
122 Cf. 2007-2013 CSP
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Coordination with other donors was limited with regard to aid modalities. While
coordination on interventions took place in some sectors, to varying degrees, there is little
evidence of coordination on aid modalities as such. Few examples have been found were the
EC analysed aid delivery options via non-EC modalities, such as notably through United
Nations bodies, the World Bank or EU Member States (see Figure 7 above).123 Following this,
three noteworthy exceptions are to be noted: (i) the EC supported local seed production in
a context of Hurricane Mitch-recovery by funding a successful FAO project; (ii) the
support to the Education for All (EFA) initiative through basket funding; and (iii) the
PASS for which the GoH is able to benefit from EU MS’ technical assistance in the sector
of public security.
Overall, the choice of EC aid modalities at the time of decision can be considered
as adequate with regard to the context of intervention for all interventions examined
based on a project approach and for the sector budget support in food security.
Most stakeholders involved (directly or indirectly) in interventions based on a project
approach did not regret the chosen EC aid modality and highlighted the overall relevance
of such an approach in their specific cases (e.g. FORCUENCAS, PROCORREDOR,
PRAEMHO, FAO-Semilla, Bosques y Agua)124. The success of the PASAH budget
support to food security policies owed mainly to benefits relating to its BS modality (see EQ
7). Regarding the sector budget support to the decentralisation policy it is difficult
to conclude on the adequacy of the modality. The use of budget support for
PROADES (2004) related to the willingness of the EC to support the decentralisation
policy of the Government of the time which was engaged in a promising dynamic in this
field. This support clearly bore political and policy risks, which unfortunately materialised
in the sense that decentralisation progressively ceased to be a priority for the Government
from 2007 onwards and that the decentralisation policy was discontinued from 2008 to
2009 (see EQ 7). This explains largely the lack of policy-level results in this field.
Nevertheless, PROADES had a longer term effect as its international technical assistance
worked on improving information and analysis available in Honduras on decentralisation,
which proved useful for preparing the present sector policy as the importance of
decentralisation rose again since 2010. In the global budget support (APERP/APN) it
is too early to have a clear view as it was launched recently. The use of budget support
showed the EC’s commitment to align on the country’s PRSP, but to which the Zelaya
administration proved with hindsight to have weak commitment. It was also not clear to
what extent the Plan de Nación of the new Government could be considered as a poverty
reduction strategy (PRS). It is too early to have a view on the success of the APERP/APN.
123 Difficulties in doing so have been largely relieved for the UN and WB since 2003 and to some extent for EU MS’
agencies since 2007.
124 See the indicators under EQ 8 in the Data Collection Grid (I-8.2.1 to I-8.6.3 in Annex 8)
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4.8.3 Implications of the choice of aid modalities (JC 8.3, 8.5 and 8.6)
The mix of EC aid delivery modalities described above had the following implications on
its cooperation with Honduras, as observed ex post:
 Strategic approach / policy dialogue: In theory, BS allows for a more strategic
approach because policy dialogue addresses strategic questions and is not concentrated
on small practical issues as in traditional projects. This is confirmed in particular for the
PASAH and also for PROADES (despite its difficulties), which have had an influence
on the food security and on the decentralisation policy respectively.125 Conversely, the
two large interventions with a project approach in the field of natural resource
management (PROCORREDOR and FORCUENCAS prior to 2008) lacked such a
strategic approach and policy dialogue. This is typically also the case for the smaller
projects funded on EC thematic budget lines (e.g. Bosques y Agua, FAO-semilla).
Nevertheless, the EC aimed at having a strategic approach and real policy dialogue in
the field of public security with the PASS, despite the fact that this programme was
based on a project approach as budget support was not judged opportune in this sector
by the 2007-2013 CSP “due to its specific characteristics”.126 The EC also tried with its
regional PREVDA programme to learn the lesson from PRRAC’s missed opportunities
for a strategic approach in terms of regional integration (e.g. risk management,
environmental protection).127
 National ownership: In theory, BS allows for more ownership because this modality
respects national procedures and funds should be integrated into the State budget. This
was for instance the case with the PASAH, where there was a very close relation
between the GoH and the ITA. But this does not always seem to be the case in
Honduras, probably due to the low predictability of BS funds and the management
difficulties associated with this modality in this country. National ownership on
PROADES’ budget support to decentralisation also melted rapidly after a change in
Government. Besides, ownership was tangible in several interventions based on a
project approach, notably when the aid modality allowed strong involvement of local
authorities and communities (PROCORREDOR, PRRAC-Desarrollo Local, Bosques y
Agua) and when the programme responded to a clear demand from the Government
(PRAEMHO).
 Delivering through country systems: Aid delivery through BS on the one hand
resulted in respect for national procedures, but on the other hand it had its own
conditions which were specific for each EC BS programme, and was little predictable.
 Capacity building / sustainability: Honduras suffers heavily in this respect from the
drawbacks of replacing the entire administrative staff after each election (see section
2.1.1). This affects most types of aid modalities and in particular budget support (see
EQ 7). While BS should in theory guarantee a much higher capacity building of
national institutions128, experience shows that a necessary condition for success in such
125 See I-7.4.3 in Annexe 8.
126 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper Honduras: 2007-2013, p. 33.
127 See I-8.3.3 and I-8.3.4 in Annexe 8 for details on this paragraph.
128 see I-8.3.5 in Annexe 8
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situations is a strong accompanying international technical assistance (ITA) programme
(see EQ 7).
 Disbursement: There have been strong disbursement issues in two of the three
budget supports (see EQ 7).
 Civil society strengthening: The various EC thematic budget lines open to (small)
projects from non-state actors through calls for proposals contributed to strengthening
civil society intrinsically, by increasing their technical skills, coverage and influence.
This was for instance the case of ‘Bosques y Agua’ which was implemented by
Christian Aid. Besides, the two large interventions examined in the field of natural
resources management129 integrated actively the strengthening of civil society in their
approach and significantly contributed to it. Besides, and surprisingly, all three budget
support interventions relied on institutions including civil society – see box hereafter.
Box 2: Involvement of civil society in BS
The three EC budget support interventions in Honduras relied on institutions including
civil society, which is unusual for this modality:
 A “Foro Tripartito de Descentralización” (FTD) was created related to PROADES,
involving the GoH, key donors130 and civil society organisations (incl. NGO networks,
universities, and unions), through which civil society was involved in the monitoring
of the national decentralisation policy, which was even a condition for disbursement
of the variable tranches of that BS programme.
 Civil society played a significant role through the Consultative Council on the Poverty
Reduction Strategy (CCERP) in 2007 and 2008 when defining both guidelines and
priorities to give to the fulfilment of the goals of the PRS. The CCERP played an
important role in PASAH implementation and should have been equally important
for APERP131.
 The PASAH promoted the creation of COTISAN, a mechanism for coordination of
42 public and private actors in the field of food security.
129 PROCORREDOR and FORCUENCAS
130 European Commission, IDB, AECID, and USAID
131 See Annex 8: I-3-1-5 and JC 3.2
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5. Conclusions and Lessons Learned
This chapter presents both conclusions and lessons learned emerging from the evaluation
findings and analysis (presented above in Chapter 4 “Answers to the Evaluation Questions”).
The conclusions are structured in a few clusters so as to facilitate an overall synthesis and
to draw lessons for the purpose of programming, design and implementation. They are
presented in the figure below and detailed thereafter. Each conclusion further refers to the
EQs on which they are based.
Figure 8: Conclusions
Strategy and
EC Added-Value
Aid Modalities
Results & Impact
C 1: Relevance and Strategy
C 2: EC Added-Value
C 4: Adequacy of Aid Modalities
C 3: Coordination
C 6: FS, Education, NRM and Decentralisation
C 8: LRRD
Clusters Conclusions
C 7: Public Security
C 5: Addressing Administrative Weaknesses
Lessons learned of EC cooperation with Honduras are presented hereafter.
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5.1 Conclusions
Conclusion 1: Relevance and strategy
The EC concentrated its cooperation in five relevant sectors. Most of
the support was aligned with government priorities and addressed the
needs of the population well. Furthermore, by choosing three inter-
linked sectors, the EC created a strong potential for synergies at local
level which remains to be fully realised.
Based on EQs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
Basis for Recommendations 4 and 6
All five main sectors of intervention have been, at one moment or another, priorities for
the GoH and/or for the population; it is also the case for reconstruction following the
1998 Mitch hurricane. This is based on the following findings:
 Food security was one of the rare sectors that was the object of a real State policy and
this since the implementation of the PRSP in 2001 of which it formed an important
part.
 Natural Resource Management was first cited as an official country priority in the
late 1950s but converted itself into a top national priority after Hurricane Mitch (1998).
 Decentralisation is a long debated question on which Honduras has gained practical
experience in the past 15 years. It has been a priority for the GoH until 2006 and again
under the new government since 2010.
 Vocational training was a priority need for the Ministry of Education. It was
perceived as an effective way to reduce poverty and to develop the productive sector of
the country which was badly in need of a better skilled workforce.
 Justice and security gained importance (linked to increasing insecurity) since the
beginning of the evaluation period until it became a high priority for the population.
Strong links exist between natural resource management (NRM), food security (FS) and
decentralisation, as explained in Box 1 in section 4.1.4. Although the EC supported large
interventions in each of the three areas, it had no overall strategy to bring about synergies
and capitalise between EC interventions132. Despite the lack of explicit linkages between
them, the interventions in the fields of NRM, FS and decentralisation were well designed in
terms of considering aspects relating to the other fields.
132 For example, all three sectors embrace common resource management at local level and strengthening municipal
capacity.
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Conclusion 2: EC added-value
Many positive results were obtained and much added value provided by
the EC’s support to the post-Mitch reconstruction, food security and
vocational training.
Based on EQs 3 and 4
Basis for Recommendation 4
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 In the strict sense of the principle of subsidiarity133, the European Commission’s added-
value in the cooperation with Honduras laid essentially in the effectiveness of a global
EU approach for the reconstruction of Central America after the 1998 Mitch
hurricane, in line with the mandate it received from the European Parliament to
prepare a Community action plan. This resulted in the PRRAC programme, which
represented a third of the EC’s cooperation to Honduras (€119m out of €371m)134.
 In a broader sense, the EC also offered added-value to the cooperation compared to
the Member States in two sectors, notably in terms of capitalisation in food security
and division of labour in vocational training:
o food security
- a significant number of past EC interventions linked to food security;
- an accumulation of experience based on analysis and evaluation of many of
these interventions; and
- the present success of PASAH in strategic terms;
o vocational training:
- The EC was the first donor to enter this sector and had developed an
expertise initially not shared by other cooperation actors; and
- PRAEMHO has obtained significant results, it has notably laid the
groundwork for the development of technical education curricula and has
become a reference for other donors.
 The EC is withdrawing from support to food security in Honduras. With regard to
education, the EC is now providing a global budget support (APERP/APN) to the
Government’s poverty reduction strategy, which covers the sectors of education and
health. However, this budget support does not make specific references to vocational
training, which could have encouraged consolidation of achievements in this field.
133 The EC added-value as evaluation criteria is defined as the extent to which the development interventions add
benefits to what would have resulted from Member States’ interventions only in the partner country.
134 See inventory in section 2.2.3 or Annex 3.
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Conclusion 3: Coordination
Following Hurricane Mitch, a true forum for coordination was created
with the setting-up of the G-16 group of donors. The EC has promoted
this forum to share information and has tried in some cases to achieve a
clear division of labour with other donors.
Based on EQs 3 and 4
Basis for Recommendation 1
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 After Hurricane Mitch in 1998, an operational and well-structured group of 16 donors
which account for 90% of total cooperation, the so-called G-16, was created. The EC
has inscribed itself in this coordination mechanism. It has coordinated different
sectoral round tables on several occasions and it will soon assume the rotating
presidency of the G-16.
 This forum, according to different stakeholders, is essentially used to share information
and allows donors to know who is doing what in which sector (there are 11 different
sectoral round tables).
 There have been attempts on the part of the EC to reach a clear division of labour.
Some were successful in the sector of education. The EC justified the focus on
secondary/vocational education by putting forward complementarities with other
donors’ cooperation and notably with the World Bank’s emphasis on primary
education. Some were not successful and were abandoned such as the will of the EC
to focus on security under PASS II while the IDB would focus on justice with the
Justice III programme.
Conclusion 4: Adequacy of aid modalities
The aid modalities have globally proven so far to be appropriate in the
context of the country for all interventions based on a project approach.
The sector budget support modality was further a success factor for aid
in food security. Regarding the sector budget support to the
decentralisation policy, few results have been obtained owing mainly to
the discontinuation of this policy; but it is difficult to conclude on the
adequacy of the modality. In the global budget support it is too early to
have a clear view as it was launched recently.
Based on EQs 7 and 8
Basis for Recommendations 1 and 3
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 For all interventions examined that were based on a project approach, such aid
modality was relevant in its intervention context.
 Budget support was considered as the first option for aid delivery by the EC in its
cooperation with Honduras. The EC budget support programmes enabled it to comply
with the aid effectiveness agenda, to support Government policies with significant
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funding and to devote time to policy dialogue and follow-up of results rather than to
project management. Structural issues relating to public sector’s technical capacity,
public policy and priorities, or governance hampered nevertheless the attainment of
target indicators (see section 4.7.2). Unexpected macro-economic and political
developments further undermined the fulfilment of payment conditions for the budget
support programmes during the period under review (see sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2).
 The budget support modality was clearly a success factor for support in the area of
food security. The PASAH benefits were indeed closely related to those of this
modality, notably in terms of strong policy dialogue and collaboration with the
Government on design and implementation of a State policy in food security.
 With the PROADES (2004) the EC aimed at supporting the decentralisation policy of
the Government of the time which was engaged in a promising dynamic in this field.
The EC envisaged a financial support of €34m through the sector budget support
modality, which would strengthen its capacity to engage in policy dialogue. This
support clearly bore political and policy risks, as acknowledged in its preparatory
documents. These risks unfortunately materialised in the sense that decentralisation
progressively ceased to be a priority for the Government from 2007 onwards and that
the decentralisation policy was discontinued from 2008 to 2009. With little progress
being made in reaching the pre-agreed target indicators and a deteriorating macro-
economic context, no more than half the funds were disbursed by 2010. The policy
context largely explains the lack of results of the budget support in this field and makes
it also difficult to conclude on the adequacy of specific modalities. However the
programme had a longer term effect as its international technical assistance worked on
improving information and analysis available in Honduras on decentralisation, which
proved useful for preparing the present sector policy as the importance of
decentralisation rose again since 2010.
 The EC showed with the use of a €61m global budget support (APERP/APN) its
commitment to align on the country’s poverty reduction strategy. But the Zelaya
administration proved in fine to have weak commitment to this strategy. The situation
further changed with the political events of June 2009 and subsequent interruption of
cooperation. Negotiations on this global budget support restarted in August 2010, with
the newly-elected government that was installed in January 2010; it resulted in an
addendum changing APERP into APN (Apoyo al Plan Nación), with a new
disbursement calendar and a new set of conditions and targets for the fixed and
variable tranches. It was not yet clear to what extent the Plan de Nación of the new
Government could be considered as a poverty reduction strategy (PRS). It is too early
to have a view on the success of APERP/APN.
 Besides, significant potential value added of budget support compared to project
support remained unrealised in terms of improvement of public financial management.
Indeed, neither of the two budget support programmes implemented so far (PASAH
and PROADES) contributed to improvements in public financial management (and in
particular to the budgeting framework).135 The EC had limited influence on the general
management of public finance in the country since its technical assistance, conditions
135 However PASAH had a positive effect on budget negotiation and allocation to food security. But it is not known
whether this effect is sustainable.
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and policy dialogue were focused in each case on a single sector. Nevertheless, the EC
contributed in other ways to addressing certain public financial management issues (see
Conclusion 5).
Conclusion 5: Addressing the administrative weaknesses
In the context of replacement of the administrative staff after each
election, the EC satisfactorily tried to mitigate related difficulties, by
involving the civil society in the programmes, by providing strong
international technical assistance in budget support programmes and
by addressing directly the issue of improving the State’s administrative
capacity through technical assistance coordinated with other donors.
Based on EQs 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8
Basis for Recommendation 8
Honduras is characterised by a system whereby the entire administrative staff is replaced
after each election by staff loyal to the newly elected political leader (see section 2.1.1). As
this system affects continuity and the level of experience and expertise, and hence
development efforts at all levels, the question of avoiding its worse consequences is
important. The responses brought by the EC concerned civil society on the one hand and
international technical assistance (ITA) on the other.
The EC tried to mitigate related difficulties in three ways:
 It involved the civil society in project implementation and/or monitoring at both local
and national levels, given that civil society can offer more continuity than governments:
- At a local level, some interventions such as FORCUENCAS, PROCORREDOR
and PASAH strengthened groups or institutions from the civil society such as
women groups, social audit or water committees which are related to local
governments but are also independent from them.
- At a higher level PASAH has supported the formation and institutionalisation of
consultative groups on food security, including government, civil society and
donors, which should function independently from who is in the government.
Besides, the ‘Foro Tripartito de Descentralización’ , reactivated in 2010 after more than
one year interruption, is another positive example of such a mixed consultative
group. The same can be said of the Consultative Council on the Poverty
Reduction Strategy (CCERP) in which civil society played an important role
supporting PASAH in 2006 and 2007 (see Box 2 in section 4.8.3); and
 It provided strong international technical assistance for its two sector budget
support programmes, given that ITA may provide some continuity between two
governments:
- In the case of PROADES this assistance arrived too late (three years after the
beginning of the intervention) to be useful in a situation in which decentralisation
had ceased to be a government priority. But it effectively prepared the Lobo
governments’ policy on this theme.
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- In PASAH, ITA played also an important role in assuring the transition between
the de facto government and the present Lobo government which assumed power
in January 2010.
 It took direct action through two technical assistance programmes (PRAP from
2004 to 2007 and PAAPIR since end of 2010)136 in order to strengthen a civil service
which would be an alternative to the actual system. The donor community is active in
this field, supporting the existing internal and external (“Tribunal Superior de
Cuentas”) audit systems, the Secretary of Finance and other key Ministries such as
health and education. The EC participated actively in the international effort and
coordination to support a plan for professionalising the public service and
implementing a non-partisan meritocratic recruitment system.
Conclusion 6: FS, Education, NRM and Decentralisation
In food security and in education, satisfactory results were achieved.
With respect to the management of natural resources, the programmes
have not yet been completed but some observations on promising
results can already be made. In decentralisation no results have been
obtained through budget support because of the discontinuation of the
decentralisation policy and the difficult macro-economic context, but
local organisations were strengthened through support in the sectors of
food security and natural resource management.
Based on EQs 1, 2, 3, and 4
Basis for recommendations 1, 4, 5, and 7
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 Food security (PASAH, FAO Semilla): The sector budget support achieved
impressive results and has fulfilled its objectives at a strategic level in terms of
improving: i) policy design (new government strategy on food security), ii) policy
instruments (supporting the design of a conditional cash transfer programme), iii) legal
framework (amended law on food security), iv) coordination within the government
and with non-state actors, v) the functioning, responsibilities and capacities of national
institutions such as UTSAN (part of the Secretary of the Presidency) and vi) budget
allocation. Only limited results have been obtained at a local level, mostly for lack of
time, but these results strengthen municipal capacities..
 Education (PRAEMHO): It is not relevant to mention an impact at sector level due to
the limited scope and size of the intervention. Nevertheless very satisfactory results
were obtained in vocational training such as:
- The development of curricula oriented towards the job market and adopted by
national authorities as national curricula;
136 PRAP (Apoyo a la Modernización de la Administración Pública en Honduras) and PAAPIR (Programa de Apoyo a la
Administración Pública y a la Integración Regional) were not included in the sample of interventions analyzed during
the evaluation. See section 3.2 and table 3.
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- The exceeded targets in terms of teachers trained (3,171 instead of 1,500) and
administrative staff trained (141 instead of 64); and
- The significant support given to students from the most vulnerable groups through
the scholarship and professional insertion programme
 Natural Resource Management (Bosques y Agua, FORCUENCAS,
PROCORREDOR): The two bilateral projects are still ongoing and thus no final
evaluation has yet been conducted. According to preliminary findings these projects
should attain their objectives of strengthening: i) local actors’ capacities: municipalities
and local groups managing common resources; and ii) national institutions such as the
“Agenda Forestal Hondureña” and the “Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos”.
Also, the Secretary of Natural Resources (SERNA) is so pleased with
PROCORREDOR methods and first results that it wants to duplicate these in other
regions. However, no policy dialogue has been conducted with respect to a national
agenda on environmental issues.
 Decentralisation: Four disbursements were made (51% of commitments) for the
PROADES budget support and a strong ITA team was established and yet this sector
budget support could not reach its objectives (see also Conclusion 4). The ITA arrived
after three years and, most importantly, the decentralisation policy was progressively
abandoned by the government from 2007 onwards, although interest picked up again
in 2010. However, at the same time, capacities of local institutions were strengthened
through the PROCORREDOR and FORCUENCAS programmes, and to a lesser
extent through the PASAH. These were indirect achievements in terms of
decentralisation as stronger municipal capacities are a condition to a successful
decentralisation policy, although they cannot replace it.
Conclusion 7: Public security
The EC approach to public security was based on an overall well-
designed programme promoting institutional reform, except that civil
society was not involved from the start as an actor to promote reform
and to monitor implementation, as recommended by OECD-DAC
guidelines.
Based on EQ 5
Basis for Recommendations 1, 2 and 3
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 The EC succeeded through intense policy dialogue to obtain that the government buy
into a sectoral justice and security approach and that the key executive and judicial
institutions work in a coordinated fashion.
 The EC took into consideration international good practices such as the
recommendations of the OECD-DAC on Security Sector Reform (SSR) when it
designed the PASS; the programme design can globally be considered as relevant. But
there is a significant exception to this: there has been no involvement of the civil
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society in the dialogue on security issues, which is also an OECD-DAC
recommendation.
 The distrust and heavy criticisms from several national and international civil society
organisations of the institutions involved in the PASS made the EC’s position difficult.
The EC has tried to address these concerns notably by establishing a dialogue with
NGOs and human rights defenders.
Conclusion 8: LRRD
The differences in institutional set-up and dynamics between ECHO
and PRRAC operations, combined with management difficulties
relating to the then on-going devolution process within the EC, led to a
delay of two years between the end of the ECHO operations and the
beginning of the PRRAC activities. This hampered the linkage between
relief operations and rehabilitation and development. But significant
efforts have been made since the mid-2000s to increasingly strengthen
this link.
Based on EQ 6
This conclusion is based on the following findings:
 Even though ECHO engaged in rehabilitation operations (approximately 20.4% of
overall humanitarian aid) and withdrew late, there was still a gap of approximately two
years (around 2001-2002) before the PRRAC was implemented in Honduras.
 This gap can be explained by (i) the difficulty of articulating relief, rehabilitation and
development projects that do not have the same dynamics and timeline; (ii) the fact
that ECHO and PRRAC operations were managed under different administrative
umbrellas; and (iii) the management difficulties relating to the devolution process from
EC’s HQ to the Regional Delegation in Nicaragua that was then under way.
 Since the mid-2000s, ECHO has had focal points in all the Delegations in Central
America. Furthermore, it submits the proposals it receives for disaster preparedness
projects to the evaluation of the Delegations. According to members from both
institutions, this collaboration on DIPECHO projects has been beneficial in terms of
knowing who does what.
 LRRD is very much related to the issue of disaster preparedness which is meant to
reduce the impact of natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch. As mentioned in earlier
evaluations, the PRRAC has failed to properly tackle this issue. By designing a regional
follow-up programme on Reduction of Vulnerability and Environmental Degradation
(PREVDA), the EC has clearly tried to remediate this missed opportunity.
Evaluation of the EC’s co-operation with Honduras
ADE-DRN
Final Report April 2012 Page 78
5.2 Lessons learned
The following lessons learned, which are complementary to the conclusions, are based on
punctual good and bad practices observed in EC cooperation with Honduras.
Lesson
Learned 1
Serious sector analysis is a key to success for all interventions. PASAH
and PRAEMHO offer two examples of interventions whose success is
partly due to the EC response to a real State policy in one sector, and
to clear State demand in the other sector.
Based on EQ 2, 3, 6
Basis for Recommendation 1
The public food security strategy is a noteworthy example of continuity through four
different governments. The EC took advantage of this continuity and of the support this
strategy received from the Secretary of the Presidency to strengthen food security by a
sector budget support including a very adequate ITA.
PRAEMHO responded to a need in the education sector which has been expressed for
almost a decade: the necessity to adapt vocational training to the present demand for
technicians. The EC responded to this with a project tailored to the features and needs of
the sector. It was therefore well received by all stakeholders and exceeded some of its
training objectives.
PROADES, until 2009, is a counter-example of an insufficient public commitment to a
policy of decentralisation.
Lesson
Learned 2
Lessons from the 2004 evaluation on EC cooperation with Honduras
were learned in terms of prioritising aid in the sectors of vocational
training and public security, and on ensuring permanent EC
presence in the country, but were neglected with regard to the need
of ensuring phasing out strategies for the projects and true policy
dialogue in the field of natural resource management.
Based on EQs 1, 2, 3 and 4
Basis for Recommendations 4, 5 and 8
The exercise here is to review important remarks and recommendations that were made in
the 2004 evaluation of the EC cooperation strategy with Honduras and to determine the
lessons that have been learned and those that have been neglected – see the table below.
Evaluation of the EC’s co-operation with Honduras
ADE-DRN
Final Report April 2012 Page 79
Table 10: Have key lessons from the 2004 evaluation been learned?
Issues during the
1992-2002 period
Responses during the
2002-2009 period
√ Lesson
learned
Approximately 100 EC staff
members in Nicaragua but
nobody in Honduras
In 2005, a Delegation was
established in Tegucigalpa.
√ Lesson
learned
Problem of unemployment,
education system not addressing
the needs of the country
The design of a project such as
PRAEMHO addressed this issue.
√ Lesson
learned
Rising insecurity and more
precisely rising juvenile
delinquency
The EC chose public security as a
focal sector in its 2007-2013
strategy and designed the PASS
programme for tackling root causes
of insecurity
Ø Lesson
neglected
Phasing-out must be considered
as being part of the management
cycle of projects
This has been taken into
consideration in some programmes
(PASAH) but not systematically
(PRAEMHO).
Ø Lesson
neglected
Need to engage in policy
dialogue if the EC truly wishes
to contribute to the protection
of the environment and to
reduce environmental
vulnerability
The EC has dedicated a significant
budget (at least €60m) to the
management of natural resources
but this financial support was not
coupled with policy dialogue.
Lesson
Learned 3
Small is beautiful (also):
Significant results may be obtained with limited means: a cooperation
responding adequately to a real demand at the right time and at strategic
level can be much more effective and efficient than disbursing high
amounts.
Based on EQ 3
Basis for Recommendations 1and 7
PASAH was a sector budget support whose total commitment (excluding ATI) amounted
to €12.4m but only €6.1m were disbursed. In financial terms, it is only the eighth most
important intervention over the evaluation period. However, it is clearly the one that has
obtained the best results in terms of strategy and impact.
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6. Recommendations
This chapter presents the recommendations emerging from this evaluation. They aim at
providing EC policy-makers and managers with advice based on the conclusions and
lessons learned from the EC cooperation with Honduras during the 2002-2009 period,
with the purpose of improving the programming, design and implementation of EC
policies. They are presented in the figure below:
Figure 9: Recommendations
R 3: Consider public sensitivity of aid modalities
R 5: Engage in policy dialogue on environmental issues
R 1: Ensure aid modalities are adequate in the sectors
R 2: Involve more civil society even in bilateral cooperation
R 7: Rethink timing of ITA
R 8: Continue strengthening directly public admin. capacity
R 10: Ensure the Delegation has access to strong PFM expertise
R 9: Maintain incentives of the BS conditionality system
R 4: Ensure consistency over time
R 6: Link decentralisation with food security and NRM
Cross-references to the supporting conclusions and lessons learned are annotated below
each recommendation. Implementation responsibilities have been defined between EC
Services at HQ and at Delegation levels. Conditions of implementation and expected
consequences are also specified where relevant.
The levels of priority for each recommendation are presented in the figure on the next
page. They are specified in terms of importance and urgency of the need to address them.
The most urgent and important recommendation are R1 and R3 on the careful analysis of
the adequacy of aid modalities and in particular the consideration of the political sensitivity
of budget support in the security sector, given that a decision might soon be taken on the
aid modality for future support in this sector (for the so-called PASS II). Another very
important recommendation relates to the involvement of civil society (R2), which is also
for the short term notably given upcoming EC decision-making on its public security
approach and civil society expectations in this regard. Besides, an urgent recommendation
is to ensure consistency over time in sectors of EC added-value (R4), given that short-term
actions might possibly still be taken for the APERP/APN indicators and possibly on
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actions for ensuring consolidation and continuity of achievements in vocational training
and food security. Similarly, recommendations for the short term are also those on
engaging in policy dialogue on environmental issues (R5) and linking decentralisation with
food security and natural resources management (R6), with a view to take action before the
PROCORREDOR and FORCUENCAS’ closure planned in 2012 and before the signature
of the financing agreement for the MOSEF – these are relatively important given the
potential for policy dialogue and synergies in those areas. The recommendations relating to
the EU Delegation’s access to strong public financial management -PFM- expertise (R10)
and PFM strengthening in budget support programmes (R8) are further also quite
important and urgent given the beginning of a large general budget support programme in
the country (APERP/APN). The recommendation on maintaining incentives of the BS
conditionality system (R9), which is particularly important with regard to the specificities of
this modality and in the context of Honduras as highlighted by senior officials, is not of the
highest urgency in the sense that a decision has already been taken on the remnant fund,
but is still applicable in the shorter term to the point that decisions will already have to be
taken shortly on BS implementation, including on the disbursement of different tranches.
There is also a case to tackle at this stage the recommendation on the timing and reporting
of ITA attached to budget support (R7).
Figure 10: Prioritisation of recommendations
Urgency
Shorter Term
Importance
Lower
Higher
Longer term
R 3 R 2
R 4
R 5
R 6
R 1
R 10
R 7
R 9R 8
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Recommendation 1 : Ensure aid modalities are adequate in the sector
Based on Conclusions 4,5 7 + lessons learned 1, 3 Implementation Responsibility: HQ + DEL
Conduct an in-depth analysis for every focal sector to determine the best aid
modality for EC aid delivery in those sectors.
The choice of the aid modality for intervening in a specific sector should be the object of
careful analysis. The Commission should in particular consider explicitly the following
aspects:
 Political consensus and commitment on the public policy under consideration
(“policy risk”);
 Specific characteristics of the sector (e.g. political sensibility - see Recommendation 4);
 Possibilities of intervention through other donors, in particular the UN, WB or EU
Member States in the light of existing agreements. This is particularly recommended in
cases where other donors are successfully intervening in a field where the EC is willing
to support but has less added-value, in line with the division of labour principle laid
down in the 2007 EC Code of Conduct and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. It
could make all the more sense in cases where the current EC aid modality procedures
might create serious implementation difficulties. This could arise for instance from the
fact that ‘direct centralised management’ has become a modality which is difficult to
manage (it can no longer be done through Project Management Units -PMUs- and has
to be done directly by the Delegation) and that ‘decentralised management’ has now to
apply the strict “devis-programme” procedures;
 National and local capacity of implementation;
 Specific characteristics and implications of the possible aid modality, in terms of
the main objectives pursued and cross-cutting issues to be considered, such as degree
of policy dialogue allowed, national ownership, PFM reform and strengthening of the
budgetary framework, capacity building at central and decentralised levels,
strengthening of civil society – see Section 4.8.3). Strengthening of civil society should
be highlighted in particular, as financing through non-state actors is important in a
country with a weak State; it should hence be actively pursued and strengthened. PFM
and budgetary framework improvement are also particularly important when
considering budget support;
 Diversification of aid modalities, taking into account risk considerations, such as the
weight of budget support in the overall cooperation (what would happen if there were
a macroeconomic crash?); and
 Fiduciary risk and governance of the beneficiary.
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Recommendation 2 : Involve civil society more
even in bilateral cooperation and in the security sector
Based on Conclusions 5 and 7 Implementation Responsibility: DEL
The involvement of civil society is essential. It may be a reliable partner in the
efforts to bring about reforms and it can play a crucial role in terms of monitoring
activities. Such involvement must be conducted while respecting the leadership
of the government.
The involvement of non-state actors is essential, in particular in a country with a weak State
like Honduras, but it raises at least two challenges: i) the multiplicity of actors with
sometimes conflicting priorities is not easy to manage and may slow down the
implementation process, and ii) such involvement may hamper the policy dialogue with the
government.
Over the evaluation period, the EC has been able to constructively seek the support of civil
society in the sectors of food security and decentralisation.
In the current political context, the involvement of non-state actors is not an easy task
especially in sectors such as justice and security. But still the Delegation should take
advantage of the intense relations it has built with civil society organisations to allow them
to provide input on government justice and security issues, such as with analysis and
watchdog reports.
Recommendation 3: Consider public sensitivity of aid modalities
Based on Conclusion 7 Implementation Responsibility: HQ and DEL
Support to certain sectors might be highly sensitive, such as in public security
which is intrinsically linked to the respect of basic human rights. Being able to
justify the use of EC funds is hence particularly important in those cases. This
should be carefully taken into account when deciding on the aid modality.
This recommendation is of general extent but also relates specifically in the present case to
the sector of public security. It is indeed a sensitive sector especially when the institutions
responsible for providing these services lack trust of the population and have poor human
rights record. In this context, it is important that the EC be able to justify good use of its
funds.
When the political stability of Honduras unexpectedly ended with the June 2009 events,
some civil society organisations criticised the EC for supporting institutions involved in
those events. At the time, the EC could explain and prove that it had designed a
programme to help reform these institutions (PASS) but that no disbursement had yet been
made.
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The EC emphasised in its 2007-2013 CSP that the possibility of a budget support approach
“seems rather unlikely, due to the specific characteristics of the public security sector” and
that “adequate formulae should be sought to promote the participation of the relevant
administrations of Member states in the implementation of the programme/project [...]”
Indeed, the specialised agencies and administrations of the Member states have the
required expertise when it comes to justice and security sector reforms. Furthermore they
can warrant confidentiality that is strongly needed in a country suffering from narco-
traffick and organised crime. These two aspects of traceability and Member States
participation are lost with the use of a Budget Support. On the other hand, budget support
may be a strong tool to bring about reforms in the public security sector as it brings
substantial funding, allows stronger policy dialogue and pays for results obtained. The EC
should in that case make sure that it is totally in line with the supported GoH policy and
that indicators are carefully chosen (including for example human rights criteria)137. The EC
should hence carefully balance the advantages of possible aid modalities against the
disadvantages.
Recommendation 4 : Ensure consistency over time
Based on Conclusions 2, 6 and lesson learned 2 Implementation Responsibility: HQ and DEL
Ensure continuity over time and strengthen consolidation of achievements in
cooperation fields with EC added-value, notably by considering carefully the
possibility of further support in food security and by having indicators in the
general budget support programme relating to consolidation of key achievements
in vocational training.
The Commission proved to have added-value in the sectors of food security and secondary
education, most specifically vocational training. Overall satisfactory results were also
achieved in these two sectors. There is hence a rationale for carefully analysing the need for
further EC support to those two sectors and to ensuring the consolidation of EC past
efforts:
 Food security : there are strong indications that the Commission is withdrawing its
support in Honduras in this sector. As mentioned above, food security is a rare
example of State policy and it is a sector where the EC brought clearly value-added. We
recommend considering carefully future EC support in this sector, taking also account
of current needs of support in this sector.
 Secondary education: The Commission changed its strategic approach in the field of
education from a support to secondary education (2002-2006 CSP, materialised in the
PRAEMHO programme on vocational training) to a General Budget Support to the
poverty reduction strategy with a focus on education and health (2007-2013 CSP).
However, indicators agreed with the GoH do not relate to secondary education or
vocational training, but to primary and basic education. We recommend encouraging
consolidation of achievements in the field of vocational training, notably through
137 A Government from another Latin American country refused for instance to have a sector budget support because it
did not agree with committing to certain proposed justice and security indicators.
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indicators in the APERP/APN general budget support relating to two main
achievements of the vocational training programme PRAEMHO. Indeed:
- The buildings of the 17 Technical Centres need to be maintained;
- The small firms created by the students of the professional insertion programmes
need to be monitored at least in the first year of their existence.
Recommendation 5 : Establish an agenda for a policy dialogue
on natural resource issues
Based on Conclusion 6 and Lesson learned 2 Implementation Responsibility: DEL
Engage in a policy dialogue on natural resource management with the GoH as a
whole (not restricted to the sector ministry). Link this dialogue to the execution
of the future MOSEF programme.
This was already a recommendation in the 2004 evaluation. The EC has spent more than
€60m on natural resource management (NRM) during the evaluation period with some
undisputable successes at a micro level. However, these successes risk having little impact
on the progressive disappearance of the Honduran forest and on the degradation of its
water resources if they are not coupled with a national policy targeting the main causes of
mismanagement of natural resources. The EC is carrying many useful sector dialogues at a
local level (see sections 4.1/4.2) but until now Honduras has not put forward a global
effective public policy in this sector. The recommendation consists of addressing this
question also at a macro level and of taking advantage of the long EC experience in natural
resource management, of the implementation of the MOSEF programme and of the
significant budget it has invested to engage in policy dialogue.
Recommendation 6: Link decentralisation with food security and NRM
Based on Conclusions 1, 2 and 6 Implementation Responsibility: DEL
The Commission should conduct an appraisal (or capitalisation of experiences)
on municipal management, thus establishing a link between its interventions in
decentralisation, food security and natural resource management. This would
permit using the important virtual synergies existing between these 3 sectors for
the implementation of the next phase of the sector budget support on
decentralisation.
Interventions in the fields of food security and natural resource management have
accumulated an important experience on municipal management and local development
activities including land planning and management of common goods. However these
experiences have never been compared between these two sectors and exploited
accordingly because no practical linkages existed. The PROADES budget support in the
field of decentralisation, which will proximately start again, will benefit from the important
work done by its international technical assistance between 2008 and 2010. However it
should also rely on the experience previously accumulated on municipal management in
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interventions on food security and natural resource management in order to improve policy
proposals. Our recommendation is to conduct an appraisal (or capitalisation of
experiences) on municipal management in order to benefit from the best practices in this
field for the implementation of the second phase of PROADES.
Recommendation 7 : Rethink timing of ITA
Based on Conclusion 4 and Lesson learned 3 Implementation Responsibility: HQ and DEL
Improve the effectiveness of international technical assistance (ITA) attached to
budget support by ensuring that they arrive at the beginning of the
implementation.
Given a low level of public financial management (PFM), weak policy design, and scarce
staff continuity at changes in governments, high level technical assistance is a felt necessity
expressed by government’s officials. This technical assistance should not only be of high
quality (as it was in the cases of PASAH and PROADES), it should also be in place during
the full implementation period.
Recommendation 8 : Continue strengthening directly
public administration capacity
Based on Conclusions 4 and 5
and Lesson learned 2
Implementation Responsibility: HQ and DEL
The EC should continue to support the national institutions in charge of the
control of public financial management (PFM), through training and technical
assistance in key Ministries coordinated with multilateral donors active in this
field.
Given the low level of public administrative capacity and the limited influence of Sector
Budget Support on improvements in public financial management (PFM), direct
interventions centred on technical assistance and training are greatly needed. Coordinated
efforts for professionalising the public service (supported by the G16) must continue and
be consolidated with two objectives: (i) improving PFM directly, and (ii) striving to
establish a more permanent and well trained staff within the Secretary of Finance and other
key Ministries. The EC should continue direct support in this field, in the same way that it
does through its PRAP and PAAPIR programmes.
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Recommendation 9 : Maintain incentives built into the BS conditionality system
Based on Conclusion 4 Implementation Responsibility: HQ
Maintain the useful incentives built into the BS conditionality system, by
delivering consistent messages to the Government on the importance of reaching
agreed targets.
Maintain as much as possible the incentives from the BS conditionality system. High
government officials recognise indeed the weaknesses of the national administrative system
and stress the usefulness of incentives and strict donor rules.
Recommendation 10 : Ensure that the Delegation has access
to strong PFM expertise
Based on Conclusion 4, 5 Implementation Responsibility: Delegations in Honduras and Nicaragua
The EU Delegation in Honduras should have access to strong public financial
management expertise for ensuring success of its budget support programmes.
Although it is difficult for each Delegation to dispose of an own autonomous service
specialised in budget support, the EU Delegation in Honduras needs to have access to
strong expertise in public financial management (PFM).
The Delegation in Honduras should indeed be able:
 to engage in a policy dialogue with the Government on PFM improvements;
 to react quickly to a rapidly changing macro situation: and
 not to depend exclusively on IMF analyses (as the EC may have different priorities).
It should therefore have close access to and interaction with both following types of expert
pools:
 The ITA of the Global Budget Support programme should have a strong expertise and
experience in PFM. The ITA of its Sector Budget Support programmes, apart from a
sector expertise, should have a good knowledge of the budget support mechanism.
 The Commission must offer strong expertise and experience in PFM, at the
headquarter and/or regional levels.
